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MISDEMEANORS FOR ALL PURPOSES?
INTERPRETING PROPOSITION 47’S
AMELIORATIVE SCOPE IN A NEW ERA OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM
Kayla Burchuk*
In 2014, Proposition 47 reclassified seven low-level felonies to
misdemeanors, demonstrating voters’ striking rejection of California’s
historically punitive sentencing policies. This Note examines the recent
wave of California Supreme Court jurisprudence interpreting
Proposition 47 by exploring the court’s varied readings of the initiative’s
ballot materials and statutory text. While the court has liberally
construed relief for affected property crimes, it has responded
ambivalently in more controversial areas such as drug offenses,
mandatory parole periods, and automatic resentencing. This variation
reveals ideological tensions between the goal of expanding ameliorative
benefits to low-level offenders and anxiety regarding public safety. This
Note analyzes the court’s opinions as expressions of Proposition 47’s
own hybrid and conflicting aims of reducing penalties for certain drug
and property crimes, while continuing to harshly punish offenders
perceived as violent and recidivist. As such, the court’s recent opinions
and Proposition 47 itself are products of California’s complex
sentencing history, which has vacillated between progressive and
reactive policy extremes.
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I. INTRODUCTION
California’s Proposition 47 is both common sense and quietly
radical, feared as a door to lawlessness and praised as a daring
experiment. On November 4, 2014, California’s voters approved a
measure that universally categorized six low-level property crimes and
simple drug possession as misdemeanors,1 created two new criminal
statutes,2 and laid out a detailed resentencing procedure for offenders
“who would have been guilty of a misdemeanor . . . had this act been
in effect at the time of the offense.”3 These changes, a marked
departure from California’s harsh Three Strikes sentencing era, were
motivated by the goal of “ensur[ing] that prison spending is focused
on violent and serious offenses”—a proposition that would save
taxpayer funds by reining in a sprawling state prison system populated
by low-risk inmates and refocus those resources towards evidencebased rehabilitative programs aimed at reducing recidivism.4
Proposition 47 was neither enacted in a vacuum nor was it rooted
in soul-searching regarding California’s punitive values. As of now, it
is the distillation of California’s forced reassessment of its historically
harsh sentencing policies, spurred by the United States Supreme
Court’s historic intervention in California’s prison system via the
Brown v. Plata5 decision. After an initial policy fix known as the
California Public Safety Realignment (“Realignment”), Proposition
47 emerged to further reduce the prison population by releasing
prisoners resentenced to misdemeanors and stemming future inflow of
1. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11350, 11357, 11377 (West Supp. 2019)
(reclassifying simple drug possession as a misdemeanor); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 459.5, 473, 476a,
490.2, 496, 666 (West Supp. 2019) (reclassifying the following property crimes as misdemeanors
where amount is less than $950: shoplifting, forgery, writing bad checks, petty theft, receiving
stolen property, and petty theft with a prior theft conviction).
2. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 459.5 (adding new crime of shoplifting); id. § 490.2 (adding new
crime of petty theft).
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.18(a) (West 2015).
4. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE FOR 2014, GENERAL
ELECTION 70 (2014), https://repository.uchastings.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2328&
context=ca_ballot_props [hereinafter VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 2014]. Recidivism remains a
major scourge of California justice reform, with roughly half of all inmates released being
reconvicted within three years. See 2018 Recidivism Report: An Evaluation of Offenders Released
in Fiscal Year 2013–14, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB. 3 (Jan. 2019) (on file with author); see
also MIA BIRD ET AL., PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL., THE IMPACT OF PROPOSITION 47 ON CRIME
AND RECIDIVISM 17–18 (2018), https://www.ppic.org/wp-content/uploads/r_0618mbr.pdf
(contrasting reduced inmate population and other gains with the stubbornness of the recidivism
rate).
5. 563 U.S. 493 (2011).
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felons for the newly downgraded crimes.6 In mere months after its
implementation, Proposition 47 tipped the scales so that California
finally complied with Brown.7 Furthermore, Proposition 47 has
continued to drive down the prison population, to the point where
California now accounts for a significant portion of the United States’
overall reduction in prison numbers.8 While many scholars have
acknowledged Proposition 47’s policy role in California’s new era of
criminal justice reform, none have closely analyzed the text of the law
itself, its corresponding ballot materials, and most significantly, its
varied interpretation by the California Supreme Court. To date, the
court has published eighteen opinions examining Proposition 47’s
scope, resentencing procedure, effect on collateral consequences, and
other related issues.9
This Note explores Proposition 47’s hybrid and conflicting aims
of reducing penalties for low-level property and drug crimes, while
continuing to harshly punish offenders perceived as violent and
recidivist. The tension between the desire (and desperate need) to
reduce the state prison population and the empathic exclusion of
unpopular offender groups features prominently in Proposition 47’s
statutes and voter pamphlet. The California Supreme Court has, in
turn, looked to these incongruent sources to discern the true voter
intent behind Proposition 47 and, thus, determine the scope of its
resentencing relief. While the court purports to honor the plain
language of the statutes, supplemented by ballot materials when
needed, it has interpreted the initiative selectively depending on
6. The California Public Safety Realignment was a series of policy changes that shifted
responsibility for low level offenders from state prisons to county jails and other forms of local
supervision. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 17.5(a)(5) (West 2014); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(h) (West
2015); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 3451–58 (West Supp. 2019); infra Section II(B).
7. People v. Valencia, 397 P.3d 936, 979 (Cal. 2017).
8. JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION—AND HOW
TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 14 (2017) (“Between 2010 and 2014, state prison populations
dropped . . . from 1.41 million to 1.3 million. . . . So 62 percent of the net national decline, and 45
percent of the gross drop in prisoners, took place just in California.”).
9. See People v. Liu, 451 P.3d 1165 (Cal. 2019); People v. Foster, 447 P.3d 228 (Cal. 2019);
People v. Valenzuela, 441 P.3d 896 (Cal. 2019); People v. Lara, 438 P.3d 251 (Cal. 2019); People
v. Colbert, 433 P.3d 536 (Cal. 2019); People v. Franco, 430 P.3d 1233 (Cal. 2018); People v. C.B.
(In re C.B.), 425 P.3d 40 (Cal. 2018); People v. Gonzales (Gonzales II), 424 P.3d 280 (Cal. 2018);
People v. Buycks, 422 P.3d 531 (Cal. 2018); People v. Adelmann, 416 P.3d 786 (Cal. 2018); People
v. Martinez, 413 P.3d 1125 (Cal. 2018); People v. Dehoyos, 412 P.3d 368 (Cal. 2018); People v.
Page, 406 P.3d 319 (Cal. 2017); People v. Valencia, 397 P.3d 936 (Cal. 2017); People v.
Romanowski, 391 P.3d 633 (Cal. 2017); People v. Gonzales (Gonzales I), 392 P.3d 437 (Cal. 2017);
Harris v. Superior Court, 383 P.3d 648 (Cal. 2016); People v. Morales, 371 P.3d 592 (Cal. 2016).
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whether the legal question concerns uncontroversial low-level
property crimes or offenses perceived as a greater threat to public
safety.10 In cases involving shoplifting, joyriding, and credit card theft,
the court has read Proposition 47 permissively, emphasizing its
ameliorative properties.11 In cases dealing with mandatory parole,
drug transportation, and automatic resentencing, the court has
interpreted the measure restrictively, highlighting Proposition 47’s
exclusionary tone.12 While voters likely approved Proposition 47 for
many contradictory reasons, the court’s recent opinions and
Proposition 47 itself are products of California’s sentencing history,
characterized by clashing interests, constituencies, and institutional
actors, all vacillating between progressive and reactive ideological
extremes.
First, this Note places Proposition 47 in a wider historical and
policy context. Part II will provide an overview of California’s
escalating sentencing laws and resulting prison expansion,
culminating in the Brown v. Plata decision and subsequent
Realignment policies. This Part will also discuss the origins of
Proposition 47, including the unlikely political coalition that promoted
the initiative and its immediate impact on California’s prison
population. Part III will examine the text of Proposition 47’s ballot
materials and the nine statutes it either created or amended, focusing
on its competing goals of reducing punishment for certain crimes,
channeling prison savings into rehabilitative programming, and
ensuring “rapists, murderers, molesters and the most dangerous
criminals cannot benefit.”13 Part IV will analyze recent California
Supreme Court jurisprudence interpreting the scope of Proposition 47
as intended and understood by voters in 2014, contrasting expansive
interpretations related to low-level property crimes with restrictive
interpretations of issues deemed a threat to public safety.
The Note will conclude in Part V, briefly touching on several
recent threats to California’s progressive sentencing reforms. As
10. Gonzales I, 392 P.3d at 441, 444 (“If the language is unambiguous, there is no need for
further construction. If, however, the language is susceptible of more than one reasonable meaning,
we may consider the ballot summaries and arguments to determine how the voters understood the
ballot measure and what they intended in enacting it.” (citation omitted)).
11. See Page, 406 P.3d 319 (vehicle theft); Gonzales I, 392 P.3d 437 (shoplifting);
Romanowski, 391 P.3d 633 (credit card theft).
12. See discussion infra Section IV(B).
13. VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 2014, supra note 4, at 39.
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overpopulated prisons continue to provide substandard inmate care
and a new rival initiative threatens to undo Proposition 47’s gains, a
clear, generous judicial treatment of Proposition 47’s ameliorative
scope is more than a doctrinal question; it represents a wider struggle
over a critical social problem.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Origins of a Crisis: From Early Statehood to Three Strikes
California has struggled to administer its correctional system
since the earliest days of statehood.14 No state prisons existed at the
time of the first constitutional convention in 1849, and the only
criminal justice topics discussed were the death penalty and the
governor’s pardoning power.15 County jails were the only system of
inmate detention, an arrangement that left counties financially strained
and prisoners housed in escape-prone temporary buildings.16 In 1852,
inmates living on the Waban, a prison ship docked in the San
Francisco Bay, and a nearby jail began building San Quentin,
California’s first state prison.17 By 1858, San Quentin housed 539
prisoners in a facility with only sixty-two cells.18
California’s first criminal code, An Act Concerning Crimes and
Punishments, created a determinate sentencing system whereby a
fixed range of minimum and maximum years of imprisonment
corresponded with each offense enumerated by statute.19 Judges could
select a term of punishment within a given offense’s range, but the law
did not guide their discretion, often resulting in excessive and widely
varying sentences.20 In 1917, to remedy the sentencing excesses of
early statehood, California implemented a superficially progressive
indeterminate sentencing system, which prevented trial courts from
14. Kara Dansky, Understanding California Sentencing, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 45, 46 (2008).
15. Id. at 47.
16. W. David Ball, “A False Idea of Economy”: Costs, Counties, and the Origins of the
California Correctional System, 664 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 26, 27–28 (2016).
17. See Don Chaddock, Unlocking History: Explore San Quentin, the State’s Oldest Prison,
INSIDE CDCR (Dec. 4, 2014), https://www.insidecdcr.ca.gov/2014/12/unlocking-history-exploresan-quentin-the-states-oldest-prison; Dansky, supra note 14, at 53.
18. CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., PRISONERS RECEIVED EACH YEAR AND ANNUAL
POPULATION OF INSTITUTIONS 1851–1945 (on file with author).
19. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 16, 1850, ch. 99, § 59, 1850 Cal. Stat. 329, 235 (“Every person guilty
of robbery shall be punished by imprisonment in the State prison for a term not less than one year,
nor more than ten years.”).
20. Dansky, supra note 14, at 50.
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attaching any sentence to a criminal conviction.21 Instead, the state
prison warden would decide the sentence length when the convicted
inmate arrived, although that decision was still constrained by the
ranges preserved from the previous sentencing scheme.22 In addition,
parole boards were granted tremendous authority to free or
indefinitely detain individuals once they had served their minimum
terms.23
Although the word “rehabilitation” did not appear in the law, the
change corresponded with California’s rise as a progressive penal
system focused on a rehabilitative model of punishment.24 The
rehabilitative model, heavily influenced by the social sciences,
emphasized the individualized assessment of prisoners’ social
characteristics and the treatment of their psychological problems with
the expert knowledge of corrections professionals.25 The growing
focus on rehabilitation in prisons paralleled the expansion of social
welfare programs under post-World War II Governors Earl Warren
and Pat Brown, which included public education, workers
compensation, and state water works.26 At the same time, parole
boards’ newly expanded discretion to evaluate inmate rehabilitation
was problematic. Many suspected that the boards disproportionately
withheld parole from black and Latino prisoners if these inmates did
not demonstrate an acceptance of the social order, or that they
alternately released prisoners without proper evaluation as a means of
easing overcrowding.27
Ronald Reagan’s governorship from 1966 to 1975 marked a sharp
turn away from the rehabilitative model and toward a view of crime as
the product of moral depravity and a breakdown of the social order.28

21. See Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 527, § 1, 1917 Cal. Stat. 665, 665 (codified as amended at
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1168 (West 2015)).
22. Id. at 666.
23. Id.
24. JONATHAN SIMON, MASS INCARCERATION ON TRIAL: A REMARKABLE COURT DECISION
AND THE FUTURE OF PRISONS IN AMERICA 27, 37, 75 (2014).
25. Id.; VANESSA BARKER, THE POLITICS OF IMPRISONMENT: HOW THE DEMOCRATIC
PROCESS SHAPES THE WAY AMERICA PUNISHES OFFENDERS 67 (2009); RUTH WILSON GILMORE,
GOLDEN GULAG: PRISONS, SURPLUS, CRISIS AND OPPOSITION IN GLOBALIZING CALIFORNIA 89
(2007).
26. BARKER, supra note 25, at 59.
27. GILMORE, supra note 25, at 90; see also Dansky, supra note 14, at 64.
28. BARKER, supra note 25, at 65.
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Against the backdrop of a crime wave,29 the Watts uprising, and the
turbulent student protests at the University of California, Berkeley,30
these arguments were particularly compelling for white suburban
voters, many of whom had migrated to California to work in the
defense industry.31 This group of conservative homeowners, fearful of
crime and concerned with property values, embraced a retributive
sentencing model that tied punishment to a specific criminal act
because it resonated with their individualistic worldview that rejected
the idea of crime as the product of society.32 Governor Reagan’s tenure
saw the creation of mandatory prison penalties for some offenses such
as those inflicting great bodily injury, and, in emphasizing victims’
suffering, reintroduced vengeance as a compelling criminal
punishment rationale.33
Changing cultural attitudes about crime and punishment were
solidified in the passage of California’s Determinate Sentencing Law
(DSL) in 1976.34 Declaring that “the purpose of imprisonment for
crime is punishment,”35 the new law, signed by Governor Edmund G.
“Jerry” Brown Jr. during his first term as governor,36 returned
sentencing power to judges and installed many of the structures that
still dominate California’s sentencing laws today.37 These included
sentencing triads where courts chose from lower, middle, and upper
terms based on mitigating or aggravating factors and enhancements
that added on to standard prison terms for various circumstances
including, for example, the use of weapons in the commission of a
crime and prior violent felony convictions, among many others.38 The
DSL contained multiple contradictions, including that indeterminate
29. See PFAFF, supra note 8, at 178 (“Between 1960 and 1991, official violent crime rates rose
by almost 400 percent, and property crime rates by almost 200 percent.”).
30. BARKER, supra note 25, at 61 (“At the same time in the mid-1960s, a youth culture and
free speech movement gained control over the Berkeley campus and racial unrest exploded in south
central Los Angeles.”).
31. Id. at 58–59.
32. Id. at 67.
33. Id. at 67–68, 75.
34. See Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act of 1976, ch. 1139, 1976 Cal. Stat. 5062.
35. Id. at 5140.
36. Jerry Brown served as California Governor twice, from 1975–1983, and later from 2011–
2018. Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr., OFF. GOVERNOR EDMUND G. BROWN JR.,
https://www.ca.gov/archive/gov39/about/index.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2019).
37. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170 (West Supp. 2019).
38. See id. §§ 667.5, 1170(a)(3), 1170(b), 12022, 12022.5; Allen Hopper et al., Shifting the
Paradigm or Shifting the Problem? The Politics of California’s Criminal Justice Realignment, 54
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 527, 542 (2014).

(9) 53.1_BURCHUK (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

5/26/2020 3:06 PM

INTERPRETING PROP. 47’S AMELIORATIVE SCOPE

187

sentences (e.g., “25-to-life”) remained the format for the most serious
crimes.39
The implementation of the DSL set off an avalanche of harsh
sentencing laws that continued for the next thirty years.40 Politicians
on both sides of the aisle aggressively introduced tough-on-crime
legislation and engaged in “drive-by sentencing,” where new laws
were passed in reaction to the latest highly publicized violent crime,
resulting in an incoherent patchwork of sentencing rules.41 From 1984
to 1991, the California legislature approved over 1,000 crime bills, and
sentencing under California Penal Code sections 1170 and 1202242
alone saw over eighty increases, including an explosion of
enhancements from 1976 to 2006.43 California’s voters also inserted
themselves into the punitive sentencing landscape via California’s
unique voter initiative system, passing numerous ballot measures that
permanently altered the state’s constitution to raise criminal penalties
and limit judges’ discretion.44 For example, in 1982, Proposition 8,
dubbed “The Victim’s Bill of Rights,” abolished the diminished
capacity defense, restricted bail, loosened evidentiary standards, and
permitted victim participation in sentencing, all within one single
initiative.45 Similarly, in 1990, Proposition 115 expanded the
definition of murder, permitted juvenile life without parole sentences,
and allowed hearsay evidence at preliminary hearings.46
39. Dansky, supra note 14, at 83.
40. Barry Krisberg, How Do You Eat an Elephant? Reducing Mass Incarceration in
California One Small Bite at a Time, 664 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 136, 138 (2016).
41. Id.; Michael Vitiello & Clark Kelso, A Proposal for a Wholesale Reform of California’s
Sentencing Practice and Policy, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 903, 920 (2004); Dansky, supra note 14, at
69; GILMORE, supra note 25, at 107–09.
42. All statutory references are to the California Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
43. Dansky, supra note 14, at 69 (citing LITTLE HOOVER COMM’N, SOLVING CALIFORNIA’S
CORRECTIONS CRISIS: TIME IS RUNNING OUT 68–76 (2007)); Vitiello & Kelso, supra note 41, at
921.
44. See Hopper et al., supra note 38, at 542 (“California voters have been equally aggressive
in increasing criminal penalties. Between 1972 and 1994, voters enacted numerous state ballot
initiatives ratcheting up sentencing laws, including Proposition 17 (1972, death penalty);
Proposition 7 (1977, murder penalty); and Proposition 115 (1990 ‘Crime Victim Justice Reform
Act’).”); see also Krisberg, supra note 40, at 137 (“The ability of California voters to change its
criminal justice policies via voter initiative is not common across the nation, and no state has used
the electoral route to alter sentencing rules more than California.”).
45. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET FOR 1982, PRIMARY ELECTION
32–35, 54–56 (1982), https://repository.uchastings.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1917&context
=ca_ballot_props [hereinafter PROPOSITION 8].
46. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET FOR 1990, PRIMARY ELECTION
32–35, 65–69 (1990), https://repository.uchastings.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2058&context
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California’s infamous Three Strikes policy, implemented in 1994
via both ballot measure and legislation, rapidly accelerated the mass
incarceration crisis that the DSL era had set in motion.47 Under these
new laws, if a defendant was found guilty of a serious or violent felony
and had been previously convicted of a serious or violent felony, that
person would serve a double sentence for the new offense.48 If a
defendant with two serious or violent prior felonies was later
convicted of any felony, no matter how minor, that person would
receive a minimum indefinite term of twenty-five years to life in
prison.49 Three Strikes also eliminated probation for repeat felons,
created unlimited aggregate sentences whereby terms must be served
consecutively in state prison only, and reduced the amount of time
certain inmates could shorten their sentences with good time credits
for education and job training.50
The cumulative effect of Three Strikes, in addition to previous
sentencing laws, was rapid swelling of California’s prison
population.51 Between 1994 and 2004, California incarcerated 80,000
second-strike felons and 4,500 third-strike felons in its state prisons.52
While some of these inmates completed their sentences, over 43,000
strikers remained incarcerated in 2004, forming 26 percent of the total
inmate population.53 From 1980 to 2006, the number of total state
prisoners expanded seven-fold, peaking at over 170,000 inmates.54
California’s prisons, which had grown from eleven facilities to thirtyfour, were so overcrowded that they operated at almost 200 percent of

=ca_ballot_props [hereinafter PROPOSITION 115].
47. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West Supp. 2019); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12 (West
2015); CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE FOR 1994, GENERAL
ELECTION 32–37 (1994), https://repository.uchastings.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2090&
context=ca_ballot_props [hereinafter PROPOSITION 184].
48. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(1) (West Supp. 2019).
49. Id. § 667(e)(2)(A).
50. Id. § 667(e)(2)(B); PROPOSITION 184, supra note 47.
51. BARKER, supra note 25, at 78.
52. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, A PRIMER: THREE STRIKES—THE IMPACT AFTER
MORE THAN A DECADE 45 (2005), https://lao.ca.gov/2005/3_Strikes/3_strikes_102005.pdf.
53. Id.
54. Monthly Report of Population, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB. (July 5, 2006) (stating a
total population of 171,000 state inmates) (on file with author); Magnus Lofstrom et al.,
California’s Historic Corrections Reforms, PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL. (Sept. 2016),
http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_916MLR.pdf.
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their design capacity.55 Over time, the overcrowding crisis created
prison living conditions that were so severely depleted they were
eventually found to constitute cruel and unusual punishment.56
B. The Breaking Point: Federal Injunction and the
Public Safety Realignment
By the early 2000s, severe prison overcrowding had created a
deadly and unconstitutional lack of mental health and medical care
inside California’s prisons, which eventually provoked the largest
federal judicial intervention into a state’s penal system in United
States history.57 Harsh sentencing laws had increased the lengths of
inmates’ stays in state prisons, creating an aging, chronically-ill
population.58 Meanwhile, these prisons were equipped to provide
psychiatric and medical care at only 100 percent of design capacity.59
Chronic overcrowding caused extremely inhumane conditions, with
severely mentally ill inmates being caged in pools of their own urine
while awaiting psychiatric care and others dying of treatable chronic
illnesses while awaiting basic medical appointments, among other
horrors.60
As conditions worsened, a series of prisoner class action lawsuits
wound their way through federal courts. In 1990, a group of prisoners
with severe mental disorders filed a class action lawsuit in Coleman v.
Wilson,61 alleging Eighth Amendment violations stemming from
insufficient mental health screening, staffing, medication distribution,
55. OFFENDER INFO. SERVS. BRANCH, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., CALIFORNIA
PRISONERS
AND
PAROLEES
2006
1
(2007),
https://web.archive.org/web/
20171219115659/http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Services_
Branch/Annual/CalPris/CALPRISd2006.pdf.
56. Hopper et al., supra note 38, at 529–30.
57. SIMON, supra note 24, at 3–15.
58. Jonathan Simon, The Return of the Medical Model: Disease and the Meaning of
Imprisonment from John Howard to Brown v. Plata, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 217, 221 (2013)
(“As a result of mass incarceration policies, prisons have accumulated and retain a population
peculiarly vulnerable to the health problems of aging and chronic illness. Estimates suggest that as
many as 40% of state prison inmates have chronic illnesses and given that prison populations are
rapidly aging, it is likely that this ratio will rise steeply in coming decades.”).
59. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 504 (2011); Arnold Schwarzenegger, Prison Overcrowding
State of Emergency Proclamation, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR OF CAL. (Oct. 4, 2006),
https://wayback.archive-it.org/5763/20101008194124/http://gov.ca.gov/proclamation/4278;
Heather Harris et al., Just the Facts: California’s Prison Population, PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL.
(July 2019), http://www.ppic.org/wp-content/uploads/jtf-prison-population-jtf.pdf.
60. Brown, 563 U.S. at 502–06, 548–49.
61. 912 F. Supp. 1282 (E.D. Cal. 1995).
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suicide prevention, recordkeeping, and speedy access to care.62 The
Coleman court found that prison administrators displayed “deliberate
indifference” to inmates’ suffering in violation of the Eighth
Amendment and appointed a special master63 to submit oversight
reports regarding the prison mental health system’s compliance with
the federal court’s remedial plans.64 In 2001, a group of medically ill
prisoners suffering from various chronic conditions filed a similar
lawsuit against then-Governor Gray Davis, claiming Eighth
Amendment violations rooted in deprivation of basic medical care in
the case Plata v. Davis,65 later renamed Plata v. Schwarzenegger.66 In
response, the district court granted injunctive relief in 2005,
appointing a receiver who would not only monitor but also control, the
day-to-day operations of medical care in all of California’s thirty-four
prisons.67
Finally, in 2009, the Plata and Coleman lawsuits were
consolidated, and a three-judge panel was appointed.68 The panel
conducted a fourteen-day hearing and issued a 184-page order that
expressly identified crowding as the primary cause of
unconstitutionally inadequate mental health care in California
prisons.69 Holding that only a reduction in population could remedy
California’s “longstanding and knowing failure to provide its
prisoners with the minimal level of medical and mental health care
required by the Constitution,” the panel commanded California to
reduce its number of inmates to at least 137.5 percent of design
capacity by removing 40,000 prisoners from the system in the next
two years.70

62. Id. at 1305–16.
63. See Lofstrom et al., supra note 54, at 28 n.2.
64. Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. at 1319, 1323–24 (“[T]he evidence of defendants’
knowledge of the gross inadequacies in their system is overwhelming. The risk of harm from these
deficiencies is obvious. The actual suffering experienced by mentally ill inmates is apparent. In the
face of this reality, the court finds that defendants’ conduct constitutes deliberate indifference to
the serious medical needs of the plaintiff class.”).
65. Complaint at 1–14, Plata v. Davis, No. 3:01-cv-01351-TEH (N.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2001)
(describing the plaintiffs’ untreated diseases and subsequent suffering).
66. No. C01-1351 TEH, 2005 WL 2932253 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2005).
67. See id. at *30; see also Lofstrom et al., supra note 54, at 28 n.2.
68. Lauren Salins & Shepard Simpson, Note, Efforts to Fix a Broken System: Brown v. Plata
and the Prison Overcrowding Epidemic, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1153, 1171 (2013).
69. Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, 922 F. Supp. 2d 882, 920–23 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
70. Id. at 962–63.
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After the State appealed, the United States Supreme Court upheld
the panel’s order in its watershed 5-4 Brown v. Plata decision.71
Writing for the majority, Justice Anthony Kennedy graphically
described the abysmal conditions of overcrowding and took the
unusual step to include three photographs within the opinion itself.72
The majority strongly echoed the Coleman-Plata panel’s injunction
mandating a population reduction as the only acceptable solution to
the population crisis.73 Other fixes, such as expanding capacity,
sending prisoners out of state, and additional hiring, would not
suffice.74 Finally, the court stated that California could reduce the
prison population without significant threat to public safety and
suggested reforms to release low-level offenders and parole
violators.75 Brown and its preceding litigation is significant in that it
not only forced California to directly confront a humanitarian crisis it
had shamefully ignored for decades, but the case also “put mass
incarceration on trial” by questioning its legitimacy in the Court’s
acknowledgement that excessive sentencing practices had caused the
crowding that, in turn, had created severe constitutional violations.76
In the wake of Brown v. Plata, California had to reduce its state
prison population by roughly 34,000 inmates in about two years.77 In
a difficult bind, returning Governor Jerry Brown quickly cobbled
together a policy package later known as the California Public Safety
Realignment, which shifted responsibility for low-level offenders
away from the state and onto California’s fifty-eight counties.78
Taking effect in October 2011, Realignment required non-serious,
non-violent, and non-sexual offenders with no serious prior
convictions to serve their sentences in county jail under county-run
post release community supervision (PRCS), or a combination of
both.79 For “non-non-non” offenders already serving state prison
71. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 502 (2011).
72. See Brown, 563 U.S. at 502–06, 510–11, 547–49 (2011) (“Just as a prisoner may starve if
not fed, he or she may suffer or die if not provided adequate medical care. A prison that deprives
prisoners of basic sustenance, including adequate medical care, is incompatible with the concept of
human dignity and has no place in civilized society.”).
73. Id. at 527–29.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 535, 538.
76. SIMON, supra note 24, at 14–15.
77. Lofstrom et al., supra note 54, at 6.
78. Id. at 5–6.
79. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(h)(3), (h)(5) (West Supp. 2019).
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terms, these inmates would now participate in a PRCS program upon
release instead of state parole, the revocation of which did not result
in a return to state prison but, rather, a short stay in county jail,
additional PRCS, or referral to another evidence-based program.80
Realignment also overtly encouraged counties to develop their
own community-based alternatives to incarceration in an effort to
lower recidivism.81 Realignment was premised on the idea that local
rehabilitation and supervision programs would better integrate
healthcare and other social services, deliver programming more
efficiently, and keep offenders rooted in their families and
communities.82
However, Realignment suffered from major flaws. In one striking
example, the State allocated $2.3 billion to help counties implement
Realignment in its first three years, but distributed the funds based on
counties’ historic imprisonment rates and with no requirements for
how counties would spend the money.83 This was problematic because
San Bernardino, a county that already sent a disproportionate number
of its residents to prison, could now receive more funding which it
could use to expand its jails, whereas counties like San Diego, which
sent fewer people to prison because it had already implemented
community-based programs, received fewer funds to continue those
programs.84
Realignment shrank the prison population but did not fully
resolve the Brown v. Plata crisis. In its first year, Realignment reduced
California’s state inmates by 27,400, easing crowding to 150.5 percent
of design capacity.85 Three years into Realignment, the population had
dropped to 140.9 percent of capacity, but the system still needed to
move or release 2,850 inmates to reach the court mandate of 137.5
percent.86
80. Hopper et al., supra note 38, at 556; see Lofstrom et al., supra note 54, at 5.
81. CAL. PENAL CODE § 17.5(a)(4)–(5) (West 2014) (“Realigning low-level felony
offenders . . . to locally run community-based corrections programs, which are strengthened
through community-based punishment, evidence-based practices, improved supervision strategies,
and enhanced secured capacity, will improve public safety outcomes among adult felons and
facilitate their reintegration back into society.”); Hopper et al., supra note 38, at 556.
82. Hopper et al., supra note 38, at 557–61.
83. Mia Bird & Joseph Hayes, Funding Public Safety Realignment, PUB. POLICY INST. OF
CAL. (Nov. 2013), http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_1113MBR.pdf; Hopper et al., supra
note 38, at 561–75.
84. Hopper et al., supra note 38, at 569–70.
85. Lofstrom et al., supra note 54, at 7.
86. Id.
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C. Proposition 47: Reform Horizon
On November 4, 2014, California voters decisively approved
Proposition 47, The Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act, ushering in
the next major piece of sentencing reform post-Realignment.87 The
ballot initiative reclassified simple drug possession and five property
crimes involving stolen property worth less than $95088 as
misdemeanors, instead of felonies or wobblers, and allowed offenders
previously convicted of those crimes to apply for resentencing.89 In
addition, Proposition 47’s voter materials promised that the changes
would reduce the state prison population by thousands of inmates and
generate hundreds of millions of dollars of savings to be deposited in
a Safe Neighborhood and Schools Fund for rehabilitation and
education programs.90
Proposition 47 enjoyed support from a surprisingly diverse
political coalition. The initiative was written and promoted by
Californians for Safety and Justice (CSJ), a non-profit that sourced its
funding from a network of other center-left political foundations
seeking to influence United States criminal justice policy and social
attitudes, such as George Soros’ Open Society Foundations and the
American Civil Liberties Union.91 Crime Survivors for Safety and
Justice, a victims group associated with CSJ’s sister organization
Alliance for Safety and Justice, also actively promoted Proposition

87. CAL.
SEC’Y
OF
STATE,
STATEMENT
OF
VOTE
91–93
(2014),
https://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/sov/2014-general/pdf/2014-complete-sov.pdf (stating Proposition
47 passed by 59.6 percent of the vote).
88. See supra note 1 (summarizing amended statutes).
89. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.18(a) (West 2015).
90. VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 2014, supra note 4, at 37 (“In total, we estimate that the
effects described above could eventually result in net state criminal justice system savings in the
low hundreds of millions of dollars annually, primarily from an ongoing reduction in the prison
population of several thousand inmates.”).
91. About Us, CALIFORNIANS FOR SAFETY & JUSTICE, https://safeandjust.org/about-us (last
visited Sept. 29, 2019) (“CSJ is the sister organization of Alliance for Safety and Justice, also a
project of Tides Center and Alliance for Safety and Justice Action Fund, a 501(c)4 project of The
Advocacy Fund. We are generously supported by a group of philanthropic foundations dedicated
to replacing over-incarceration with new safety priorities, including Ford Foundation, Fund for
Nonviolence, Open Society Foundations, Public Welfare Foundation, Rosenberg Foundation, The
California Endowment, The California Wellness Foundation, The James Irvine Foundation, and
The Butler Family Fund.”); Jim Miller, National ACLU Spends Big for California’s Proposition
47,
SACRAMENTO
BEE
(Oct. 22,
2014),
https://www.sacbee.com/news/politicsgovernment/capitol-alert/article3310071.html; Paige St. John, Prop. 47 Puts State at Center of a
National
Push
for
Sentencing
Reform,
L.A.
TIMES
(Nov. 1,
2014),
http://www.latimes.com/local/politics/la-me-ff-pol-1101-proposition47-20141101-story.html.
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47.92 However, unlike victim-advocates of the past,93 the CSJ’s
racially diverse representatives publicly rejected the excesses of mass
incarceration as counterproductive to community healing and opposed
retribution as an automatic response to personal tragedy.94 On the
other end of the spectrum, conservative billionaire B. Wayne Hughes,
Jr. supported Proposition 47 from its early stages.95 Right-wing figures
Newt Gingrich and Senator Rand Paul later joined Hughes to publish
editorials praising the measure as a solution to the expensive and
ineffective imprisonment of low-level offenders.96 While Attorney
General Kamala Harris and Governor Jerry Brown remained neutral
during the campaign, democratic Senator Diane Feinstein vehemently
opposed the initiative.97
In the four years since its passage, Proposition 47’s effects on the
prison population, crime rates, and the state’s budget have begun to
take shape. Within two months of the November 2014 election, the
total prison population sank below the 137.5 percent mark mandated
by the three-judge panel.98 By December 2016, the state prison
population had declined by over 15,000 inmates, helping return the
incarceration rate in California to pre-Three Strikes levels and jail
92. See Jazmine Ulloa, Survivors of Violent Crime Raise Their Voices in California to Call
for a New Approach to Criminal Justice, L.A. Times (Apr. 17, 2018),
http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-national-crime-victims-week-20180417-story.html;
Krisberg, supra note 40, at 148.
93. See BARKER, supra note 25, at 77 (describing the moral juxtaposition of the worthiness of
crime victims against the unworthiness of criminals).
94. See ALL. FOR SAFETY & JUSTICE, CRIME SURVIVORS SPEAK: THE FIRST-EVER NATIONAL
SURVEY
OF
VICTIMS’
VIEWS
ON
SAFETY
AND
JUSTICE
(2016),
https://allianceforsafetyandjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/documents/Crime%20Survivors%
20Speak%20Report.pdf; Sarah Stillman, Black Wounds Matter, NEW YORKER (Oct. 15, 2015),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/black-wounds-matter; Ulloa, supra note 92.
95. See Katia Savchuk, Why a Conservative Billionaire Is Backing Criminal Justice Reform
in California, FORBES (Oct. 30, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/katiasavchuk/2014/10/30/
why-a-conservative-billionaire-wants-to-reduce-sentences-for-drug-and-theft-crimes-incalifornia.
96. Newt Gingrich & B. Wayne Hughes Jr., What California Can Learn from the Red States
on Crime and Punishment, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/laoe-0917-gingrich-prop—47-criminal-justice-20140917-story.html; Rand Paul & B. Wayne
Hughes Jr., Republicans Should Back Prop. 47, ORANGE CTY. REG. (Oct. 29, 2014),
https://www.ocregister.com/2014/10/29/rand-paul-and-b-wayne-hughes-jr-republicans-shouldback-prop-47.
97. Dianne Feinstein, Opinion, Prop. 47 Will Make Californians Less Safe, L.A. DAILY NEWS
(Oct. 15, 2014), https://www.dailynews.com/2014/10/15/prop-47-will-make-californians-lesssafe-dianne-feinstein (“This would mean shorter prison sentences for serious crimes like stealing
firearms, identity theft and possessing dangerous narcotics such as cocaine and date rape drugs . . . .
The crimes that would be reclassified from a felony to a misdemeanor are not minor crimes.”).
98. Lofstrom et al., supra note 54, at 7.
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population to near pre-Realignment levels.99 Overall, crime in
California remains comparable to the low crime rates of the early
1960s.100 No evidence has emerged that Proposition 47 has affected
violent crime rates, although there was a minor uptick in property
crime after November 2014, specifically thefts out of cars and
shoplifting.101
Proposition 47 has redistributed $199 million in corrections
savings to date.102 In June 2017, the Board of State and Community
Corrections distributed a first round of $103 million in community
grants, followed by a second round of $96 million in June 2019.103 The
funding went to local governments, health services agencies, and
probation departments, among others, to provide substance abuse and
mental health treatment, recidivism prevention, and housing services
to Proposition 47 affected individuals.104
III. STATUTES AND BALLOT MATERIALS
Proposition 47’s nine amended criminal statutes and the Voter
Guide pamphlet available on November 4, 2014 are the primary legal
texts courts use to interpret voter intent regarding the initiative’s
ameliorative scope.105 To explore later judicial interpretation, it is
essential to first examine not only the statutory text, but also the
various sections of the electoral materials as they communicated the
effects of Proposition 47 to the electorate, theoretically shaping the
electorate’s legislative intent.

99. BIRD ET AL., supra note 4, at 5.
100. Id. at 8.
101. Id. at 7–14; PFAFF, supra note 8, at 152.
102. Board Awards $96m in Prop 47 Grants, CAL. BD. OF STATE & CMTY. CORR. (June 13,
2019), http://www.bscc.ca.gov/news/board-awards-96m-in-prop-47-grants; Board Awards $103m
in Prop 47 Funds to Innovative Rehabilitative Programs, CAL. BD. OF STATE & CMTY. CORR.
(June 8, 2017), https://www.bscc.ca.gov/news/board-awards-103m-in-prop-47-funds-to-innovaterehabilitative-programs.
103. Board Awards $96m in Prop 47 Grants, supra note 102; Board Awards $103m in Prop 47
Funds to Innovative Rehabilitative Programs, supra note 102.
104. Id.; Jazmine Ulloa, Prop. 47 Got Thousands out of Prison. Now, $103 Million in Savings
Will
Go
Towards
Keeping
Them
Out,
L.A.
TIMES
(Mar. 29,
2017),
https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-sac-prop-47-grant-awards-20170329-htmlstory.html;
Board Awards $96m in Prop 47 Grants, supra note 102; Board Awards $103m in Prop 47 Funds
to Innovative Rehabilitative Programs, supra note 102.
105. E.g., People v. Buycks, 422 P.3d 531, 539 (Cal. 2018).
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A. Statutes Reducing Felonies to Misdemeanors
Proposition 47 created three new criminal statutes and altered six
others, which lowered penalties for low level drug and property
offenses and created a specific misdemeanor resentencing
procedure.106 As with the ballot measure text of Proposition 47, these
new and amended statutes reflect the tension between the goals of the
limited reduction of criminal penalties for nonviolent crimes and the
emphatic exclusion of a certain offender population convicted of
offenses viewed as especially heinous.
Proposition 47 converted five property crimes involving amounts
under $950 and the crime of simple drug possession from felonies to
misdemeanors.107 Check forgery valued below $950 became a
misdemeanor, so long as the perpetrator was not part of the barred
super-strike and sex offender population and, in addition, had not been
convicted of both forgery and identity theft at the same time.108
Writing a bad check for less than $950, with intent to defraud and
knowledge that funds were insufficient, was also reclassified as a
misdemeanor, as well as receiving stolen property in the amount of
less than $950.109
To further ameliorate punishment for low-level offenses, the
measure created two new California Penal Code statutes.110 Newly
minted section 459.5 formally recognized the new misdemeanor of
“shoplifting” as “entering a commercial establishment with intent to
commit larceny while that establishment is open during regular
business hours, where the value of the property that is taken or
intended to be taken does not exceed nine hundred fifty dollars.”111
Similarly, section 490.2 distinguished the new misdemeanor of “petty
theft” from felony grand theft if “the value of the money, labor, real

106. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11350, 11357, 11377 (West Supp. 2019); CAL.
PENAL CODE §§ 459.5, 473, 476a, 490.2, 469, 666 (West Supp. 2019); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1170.18 (West 2015).
107. See VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 2014, supra note 4, at 70–74.
108. CAL. PENAL CODE § 473(b) (West Supp. 2019); see also Gonzales II, 424 P.3d 280, 286–
88 (Cal. 2018) (holding that the forgery and identity theft offenses must have been made in
connection with each other for felony sentencing to apply).
109. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 476a, 496.
110. See id. §§ 459.5, 473, 476a, 490.2, 469, 666; CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.18 (West 2015);
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY §§ 11350, 11357, 11377; VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 2014, supra note
4, at 70–74.
111. CAL. PENAL CODE § 459.5 (West Supp. 2019) (“Any other entry into a commercial
establishment with intent to commit larceny is burglary.”).

(9) 53.1_BURCHUK (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

5/26/2020 3:06 PM

INTERPRETING PROP. 47’S AMELIORATIVE SCOPE

197

or personal property taken does not exceed nine hundred fifty
dollars.”112 The statute that created misdemeanor petty theft also
explicitly blocked misdemeanor status for the theft of a firearm, which
some Proposition 47 opponents had falsely criticized in the ballot
materials.113 In keeping with Proposition 47’s exclusion of serious
super-strike and sex offender populations, if an individual from that
group committed what the law would otherwise categorize as petty
theft or shoplifting, the new laws would impose a felony punishment
regardless.114
Outside of the property realm, Proposition 47 changed the simple
possession of most drugs to a misdemeanor.115 Whereas previously the
line between drug possession felonies, wobblers, and misdemeanors
had depended on amount and type of drug, the newly amended statute
made the illegal possession of most Schedule I, II, and III drugs always
punishable only up to one year in jail.116 The substances covered
included a wide array of opioids, hallucinogenic substances,
stimulants, and various prescription drugs if taken illegally.117
Consistent with Proposition 47’s emphatic promise to “[e]nsure
people convicted of murder, rape, and child molestation will not
benefit,”118 every criminal statute created or modified by the ballot
measure repeats the same string of statutory language used to deny
benefits to specific individuals previously convicted of certain violent
and sexual offenses known as “super strikes.”119 First, lower penalties
are withheld from any person previously convicted of any crime listed
in section 667(e)(2)(C)(iv), a subsection within California’s Three
Strikes statute.120 No individual with an underlying conviction for any
112. Id. § 490.2.
113. Compare id. § 490.2(c) (creating the crime of misdemeanor petty theft), with VOTER
INFORMATION GUIDE 2014, supra note 4, at 39 (falsely claiming theft of a handgun would become
a misdemeanor under Proposition 47).
114. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 459.5, 490.2.
115. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11350.
116. See id.; VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 2014, supra note 4, at 35.
117. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11054, 11055, 11056, 11350.
118. VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 2014, supra note 4, at 70.
119. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 459.5, 473, 476a, 490.2, 469, 666; CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.18
(West 2015); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY §§ 11350, 11357, 11377 (“[O]ne or more prior convictions
for an offense specified in clause (iv) of subparagraph (C) of paragraph (2) of subdivision (e)
of Section 667 or for an offense requiring registration pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290 . .
. .”).
120. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2)(C)(iv) (West Supp. 2019); see also Super Strikes, SAN
DIEGO OFFICE OF THE PUB. DEF., https://www.sandiegocounty.gov/content/sdc/public_defender/
super_strikes.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2019).
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homicide offense, various sex crimes involving children under
fourteen, sexually violent offenses, or any “serious or violent felony
offense punishable in California by life imprisonment or death,”
among others, can ever benefit under Proposition 47.121
In addition, Proposition 47 excludes individuals required to
register under California’s Sex Offender Registration Act based on
convictions for various sex crimes.122 Every statute enacted by
Proposition 47 explicitly prohibits both new misdemeanor sentences
and resentencing of past offenses for this carve-out population of
serious super-strike and sex offenders.123
B. Resentencing Procedure
In addition to reclassifying certain felonies as misdemeanors for
future prosecutions, Proposition 47 created a retroactive resentencing
process for individuals convicted of felonies, “who would have been
guilty of a misdemeanor . . . had [Proposition 47] been in effect” when
the original crime was committed.124 Newly added section 1170.18
allows individuals currently serving sentences for eligible crimes to
go before the original sentencing court and request to have their
sentences changed to misdemeanors “in accordance with” one of the
listed criminal or drug statutes amended by Proposition 47.125
If an offender otherwise qualifies, the trial court may still block
resentencing if it determines the petitioner would present “an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.”126 The statute defined
121. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2)(C)(iv) (naming assault with a machine gun on a police
officer, possession of a weapon of mass destruction, and solicitation to commit murder as additional
super-strikes); see also supra note 113.
122. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 459.5, 473, 476a, 490.2, 469, 666; CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.18
(West 2015); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY §§ 11350, 11357, 11377; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 290
(West 2014) (“This paragraph does not apply to a person who is subject to registration pursuant to
paragraph (2) or (3).”).
123. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 459.5, 473, 476a, 490.2, 469, 666; CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.18
(West 2015); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY §§ 11350, 11357, 11377.
124. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.18(a) (West 2015).
125. Id.; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.18(l) (“If the court that originally sentenced the
petitioner is not available, the presiding judge shall designate another judge to rule on the petition
or application.”); People v. Adelmann, 416 P.3d 786, 790–92 (Cal. 2018) (holding that the original
sentencing court has jurisdiction over resentencing, not the jurisdiction where petitioner transferred
probation, due to familiarity with case details); People v. Page, 406 P.3d 319, 323 (Cal. 2017)
(clarifying that a petitioner does not need to be charged with a crime enumerated by Proposition 47
in order to be resentenced in “accordance with” one of the listed statutes); infra Section IV(A)
(discussing Page).
126. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.18(b); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2)(C)(iv) (West
Supp. 2019) (listing super-strike offenses).
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the phrase as “an unreasonable risk that the petitioner will commit a
new violent felony,” recycling the same super-strike standard used to
bar certain current and future offenders from receiving any and all
Proposition 47 benefits.127 In evaluating the likelihood a petitioner will
commit a new super-strike, a court considers the nature of the person’s
criminal history, including “the type of crimes committed, the extent
of injury to victims, the length of prior prison commitments, and the
remoteness of the crimes,”128 in addition to the petitioner’s prison
records and any other relevant evidence.129 As an extra safety
precaution, even if a court approves recall of the sentence and
resentencing to a misdemeanor, the petitioner must automatically
serve a mandatory year of state parole upon release, unless the court
specifically chooses to waive the requirement.130 Section 1170.18 also
permits the re-designation, as opposed to resentencing, of applicable
felonies as misdemeanors for individuals who had already completed
their sentences and, in those cases, does not require the public safety
assessment and parole period.131
As with all other aspects of Proposition 47’s legal framework, any
applicant with a previous super-strike conviction is never eligible for
any form of post-conviction resentencing or re-designation of previous
felonies.132 Finally, if a court permits resentencing or resignation of a
previous felony to a misdemeanor, it “shall be considered a
misdemeanor for all purposes,” except as it relates to firearm
possession and ownership.133 As we will see, the extent of “for all
purposes” will greatly depend on the California Supreme Court’s
detailed interpretation of the language of Proposition 47’s statutes and
ballot pamphlet.134

127. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.18(c) (West 2015); see also CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 459.5, 473,
476a, 490.2, 469, 666; CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.18 (West 2015); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
§§ 11350, 11357, 11377.
128. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.18(b)(1).
129. Id. § 1170.18(b)(2).
130. Id. § 1170.18(d); see also People v. Morales, 371 P.3d 592, 594 (Cal. 2016) (holding that
credit for time served does not reduce the Prop 47’s one-year parole period because the voters were
informed and intended that a person who benefitted from the new legislation would be placed on
parole for one year subject to the court’s discretion).
131. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.18(f).
132. Id. § 1170.18(i).
133. Id. § 1170.18(k).
134. See, e.g., People v. Buycks, 422 P.3d 531, 539 (Cal. 2018) (major judicial analysis of
phrase “for all purposes”).
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C. Ballot Materials
The Official Voter Information Guide of the November 4, 2014
General Election (“Voter Information Guide”) is the primary legal
document outside of the statutes themselves that courts use to interpret
Proposition 47.135 Eleven of the informational pamphlets’ pages
contained Proposition 47’s Official Title and Summary by the
Attorney General, analysis by the non-partisan Legislative Analyst,
emotionally charged Arguments pages, and finally a full legal text of
the proposed Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act.136
The Attorney General’s “Official Title and Summary” opened the
measure with a bulleted list that succinctly explained the core ideas of
Proposition 47:
Criminal Sentences. Misdemeanor Penalties. Initiative
Statute.
• Requires misdemeanor sentence instead of felony for
certain drug possession offenses.
• Requires misdemeanor sentence instead of felony for the
following crimes when amount involved is $950 or less:
petty theft, receiving stolen property, and forging/writing
bad checks.
• Allows felony sentence for these offenses if person has
previous conviction for crimes such as rape, murder, or
child molestation, or is registered sex offender.
• Requires resentencing for persons serving felony
sentences for these offenses unless court finds
unreasonable public safety risk.
• Applies savings to mental health and drug treatment
programs, K–12 schools, and crime victims.137
A detailed description by the Legislative Analyst followed, which
explained Proposition 47’s proposed statutes reducing penalties in lay
speak.138 Next, the Legislative Analyst reviewed Proposition 47’s

135. See VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 2014, supra note 4. Published by the California
Secretary of State, the eighty-page ballot supplement contained descriptions of four other ballot
initiatives, candidate statements, campaign finance reports, and political party statements of
purpose, among other information. Id. at 3; see, e.g., Buycks, 422 P.3d at 539 (courts look to the
Voter Information Guide to ascertain voters’ intent in passing Proposition 47).
136. VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 2014, supra note 4, at 34–39, 70–74.
137. Id. at 34.
138. Id.
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resentencing policy, wherein individuals serving felony sentences for
the property and drug crimes reclassified as misdemeanors would be
able to “apply to have their felony sentences reduced to misdemeanor
sentences” unless they had previously “committed a specified severe
crime,” in which case the conviction would remain a felony.139
Returning again to the contrast between low-level and serious
offenders, the measure emphasized that a court is “not required” to
resentence someone if the court determines that person will “commit
a specified severe crime” in the future.140 As a final safeguard, the
Legislative Analyst mentioned that all imprisoned offenders a court
deemed safe for resentencing and release would be required to spend
one year on state parole (as opposed to county-run PRCS) unless a
judge optionally waived the requirement.141
Last, under “Fiscal Effects,” the Legislative Analyst provided an
extensive projection of the Proposition 47’s financial impact.142 This
included the anticipation that Proposition 47 would generate savings
“in the low hundreds of millions of dollars,” for the state criminal
justice system.143 First, the reclassification would “make fewer
offenders eligible for state prison” so that in several years the prison
population would begin to shrink by several thousand inmates
annually on an ongoing basis.144 Second, Proposition 47 would create
an ongoing outflow of thousands of recently resentenced prisoners for
several years after the measure’s implementation.145 On the county
side, the Legislative Analyst projected a savings of “several hundred
million dollars annually,” created by freeing up space in county jails,
seeing as those sentenced to jail for misdemeanors versus felonies
would spend less, if any, time in jail.146 Finally, it was anticipated that
the California justice system would save money in the long run if the
mental health and substance abuse programs funded by Proposition 47
increased enrollment, therefore precluding commission of future
crimes.147
139. VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 2014, supra note 4, at 36.
140. Id.; see also supra Section III(B) (explaining how section 1170.18 imports the concept of
super-strikes from the Three Strikes era).
141. VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 2014, supra note 4, at 36.
142. See id. at 36–37.
143. Id. at 37.
144. Id. at 36.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 34.
147. Id. at 37.

(9) 53.1_BURCHUK (DO NOT DELETE)

5/26/2020 3:06 PM

202

[Vol. 53:179

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

The back pages of the Voter Information Guide featured the
complete proposed text of the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act,
including the language of all proposed statutory amendments to
California’s penal, government, and health and safety codes.148 The
act also included an uncodified preamble and uncodified final clauses
that spoke to Proposition 47’s purpose.149 Despite never becoming
legal statutes themselves, the California Supreme Court cited these
sections heavily in its later cases analyzing voter intent.150 Under
section 2 of the preamble, “Findings and Declarations,” it stated:
The people enact the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act
to ensure that prison spending is focused on violent and
serious offenses, to maximize alternatives for nonserious,
nonviolent crime, and to invest the savings generated from
this act into prevention and support programs in K–12
schools, victim services, and mental health and drug
treatment. This act ensures that sentences for people
convicted of dangerous crimes like rape, murder, and child
molestation are not changed.151
The following section, section 3, “Purpose and Intent,” listed six
numbered items as “the purpose and intent of the people of the State
of California” in enacting Proposition 47:
(1) Ensure that people convicted of murder, rape, and child
molestation will not benefit from this act. (2) Create the Safe
Neighborhoods and Schools Fund . . . (3) Require
misdemeanors instead of felonies for nonserious, nonviolent
crimes like petty theft and drug possession, unless the
defendant has prior convictions for specified violent or
serious crimes. (4) Authorize consideration of resentencing
for anyone who is currently serving a sentence for any of the
offenses listed herein that are now misdemeanors. (5)
Require a thorough review of criminal history and risk
assessment of any individuals before resentencing to ensure
148. Id. at 70–74 (utilizing italic text to indicate amended and strikethrough text to indicate
deleted statutory language); see supra Section III(A) (explanation of the specific statutory changes
enacted by Proposition 47).
149. VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 2014, supra note 4, at 70, 74.
150. See, e.g., People v. Buycks, 422 P.3d 531, 539 (Cal. 2018) (“Finally, uncodified sections
of Proposition 47 informed voters that the act ‘shall be broadly construed to accomplish its
purposes,’ and that its provisions ‘shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes.’”).
151. See id. at 70.
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that they do not pose a risk to public safety. (6) This measure
will save significant state corrections dollars on an annual
basis . . . .152
At the very end of the act, after the text of the proposed laws, section
15, “Amendment,” instructs, “This act shall be broadly construed to
accomplish its purposes,” and further down, section 18 titled, “Liberal
Construction,” similarly reads, “This act shall be liberally construed
to effectuate its purposes.”153
IV. CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT INTERPRETATION
The court’s varied reading of Proposition 47’s purpose has
noticeably reflected the multiple conflicting goals contained in the
measure’s amended statutes and ballot materials. Since June 2016, the
court has published eighteen opinions tackling various provisions of
Proposition 47, addressing a broad range of substantive and procedural
legal questions.154 It is noteworthy that in all but three of the eighteen
cases, all seven justices voted unanimously, with the occasional very
short concurring opinion, often highlighting a peripheral issue.155 In
addition, the California Court of Appeal has published over two
hundred opinions that reference Proposition 47, so it is likely this trend
will continue.156
In addition to a penchant for unanimity, the opinions apply the
same core methods of statutory interpretation rooted in California
precedent. The court reads statutes enacted by ballot initiatives as it
does those enacted by the state legislature, “beginning with the text as
the best guide to voter intent and turning to extrinsic sources such as
ballot materials [when necessary] to resolve ambiguities.”157 First, the
court carefully examines the plain language of the statute itself,

152. Id.
153. Id. at 74.
154. See supra note 9.
155. See, e.g., In re C.B., 425 P.3d 40, 51 (Cal. 2018) (Liu, J., concurring) (agreeing with
majority but noting that defendants alternately could have raised a claim under the California right
to privacy).
156. See, e.g., People v. Baldwin, 241 Cal. Rptr. 3d 786 (Ct. App. 2018) (recent California
Court of Appeal case interpreting various aspects of Proposition 47); People v. E.P. (In re E.P.),
240 Cal. Rptr. 3d 888 (Ct. App. 2018) (same); People v. Acosta, 239 Cal. Rptr. 3d 833 (Ct. App.
2018) (same).
157. See, e.g., id. at 44.
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“affording the words their ordinary and usual meaning.”158 The court
also analyzes the language of an individual provision in the context of
a statute as a whole and as part of a wider “statutory scheme,” such as
all nine codified sections adapted or created by Proposition 47, as they
interact with and modify each other.159 If looking at plain meaning,
statutory structure, and the statutory scheme as a whole all fail, the
court will rely on extrinsic evidence such as ballot materials to gain
insight into voters’ intended purpose.160 Finally, the court repeatedly
follows the presumption that voters were “aware of existing laws at
the time the initiative was enacted” just as the legislature would have
been.161
Despite their stated status as merely supplementing unclear
statutory language,162 ballot materials feature consistently in the
court’s reading of Proposition 47. The court frequently references the
Voter Guide as secondary support in cases where a statute “means
what it says,” and occasionally features it as a focal point in its
analysis.163 In at least two cases, electoral materials arguably supplant
clear statutory text, sparking a rare debate among justices.164
While the court claims to adhere to traditional interpretive
principles, it applies those principles unevenly depending on the
contested subject matter within Proposition 47’s scope, revealing
ideological tensions between expanding ameliorative benefits to lowlevel offenders and anxieties regarding public safety. For cases
involving minor property crimes, the justices have been incredibly
creative in their ability to utilize the smallest turns of phrase to expand
158. Gonzales II, 424 P.3d 280, 284 (Cal. 2018) (quoting Alcala v. Superior Court, 185 P.3d
708, 717 (Cal. 2018)).
159. People v. Adelmann, 416 P.3d 786, 787 (Cal. 2018); Gonzales I, 392 P.3d 437, 447 (Cal.
2017).
160. See Gonzales II, 424 P.3d at 286; People v. Valencia, 397 P.3d 936, 959 (Cal. 2017).
161. People v. Buycks, 422 P.3d 531, 541 (Cal. 2018) (quoting Prof’l Eng’rs in Cal. Gov’t v.
Kempton, 155 P.3d 226, 246 (Cal. 2007)); accord Adelmann, 416 P.3d at 791; People v. Martinez,
413 P.3d 1125, 1129 (Cal. 2018); Valencia, 397 P.3d at 952 (quoting Prof’l Eng’rs in Cal. Gov’t,
155 P.3d at 246); People v. Romanowski, 391 P.3d 633, 636 (Cal. 2017); People v. Morales, 371
P.3d 592, 595 (Cal. 2016).
162. Gonzales I, 392 P.3d at 444 (quoting In re Tobacco II Cases, 207 P.3d 20, 31 (Cal. 2009))
(“If the language is unambiguous, there is no need for further construction. If, however, the
language is susceptible of more than one reasonable meaning, we may consider the ballot
summaries and arguments to determine how the voters understood the ballot measure and what
they intended in enacting it.”).
163. People v. Page, 406 P.3d 319, 324 (Cal. 2017).
164. See Gonzales I, 392 P.3d at 450–55 (Cal. 2017) (Chin, J., dissenting); Valencia, 397 P.3d
at 964–77, 977–89 (Cal. 2017) (Liu, J., dissenting) (Cuellar, J., dissenting).
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the number and type of offenses eligible for reduction to a
misdemeanor. Conversely, when drug crimes or procedures for
filtering out serious offenders are involved, the court often takes a
negative stance, reading a restrictive voter intent from the ballot
materials and denying defendants’ claims based on varied applications
of statutory retroactivity. Viewed in isolation, these opinions might
appear as dry exercises in statutory interpretation or moot debates over
niche legal questions regarding petty crimes, with little wider
significance for California’s criminal reform debate. Taken as a
whole, however, many fascinating contradictions emerge.
A. Expansive Approach to Property Crimes
The court has taken a creative and generous approach to its
interpretation of Proposition 47 regarding property crimes, extending
misdemeanor status to varied forms of criminal conduct outside of the
offenses expressly named in the ballot initiative.165 To accomplish
this, the court has expansively interpreted the new shoplifting and
petty theft statutes created by Proposition 47. As support, the court has
construed the ballot materials to prioritize voters’ desire to reduce
punishment for non-violent crimes, with an emphasis on the value of
property taken versus the type of property or method of taking.
The court’s sensible flexibility is typically illustrated in People v.
Romanowski,166 an earlier case that explored whether theft of access
card information (data from a debit or credit card) under $950 is
eligible for reduction to a misdemeanor.167 The petitioner had been
convicted for theft of access card information under section 484e(d),
a statute and offense not explicitly mentioned in the text of Proposition
47, and the trial court had therefore denied his petition for
resentencing.168 However, the court found that Romanowski’s
conviction could be reduced to a misdemeanor based on a reading of
the recently enacted petty theft statute.169 Section 490.2 had created a
new misdemeanor for “obtaining any property by theft” worth less
than $950 “[n]otwithstanding . . . any other provision of law defining

165. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 459.5, 473, 476a, 490.2, 496, 666 (West Supp. 2019); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11350, 11357, 11377 (West Supp. 2019).
166. 391 P.3d 633 (Cal. 2017).
167. Id. at 634–35.
168. Id. at 635.
169. Id.
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grand theft,” which the court interpreted to encompass the theft of
access code information under section 484e(d).170
The court bolstered its statutory interpretation with excerpts from
the ballot materials stating that Proposition 47’s purpose was to “be
liberally construed,” “[r]equir[ing] misdemeanors instead of felonies
for nonserious, nonviolent crimes.”171 Thus, the court would no longer
label theft of property worth less than $950 grand theft “solely because
of the property involved.”172 Taken together with the statute’s plain
language, the ballot materials established that the reasonable voter
would intend and expect theft of access card information under the
threshold amount to receive downgraded punishment under
Proposition 47.173
An earlier case, People v. Gonzales,174 represents one of the
court’s first major departures from the application of everyday
meaning to the language of Proposition 47. The case examined
whether a defendant’s entry into a bank to cash a forged check worth
less than $950 could be resentenced as a misdemeanor under the new
crime of shoplifting.175 Newly created section 459.5 defined
shoplifting as “entering a commercial establishment with intent to
commit larceny,” whereas cashing forged checks is considered a
distinct offense of theft by false pretenses.176
Rather than interpret shoplifting as the taking of tangible
merchandise from a store, which directly comported with the physical
taking associated with larceny, the court opted to take an obscure
historical route.177 The opinion explained that in 1927, two criminal
statutes had consolidated the three historical concepts of stealing:
larceny, theft by false pretenses, and embezzlement, and had
reorganized them under the label “theft.”178 At the same time, an
additional statute had retroactively substituted the broadened
170. Id.; CAL. PENAL CODE § 490.2 (“Notwithstanding Section 487 or any other provision of
law defining grand theft, obtaining any property by theft where the value of the money, labor, real
or personal property taken does not exceed nine hundred fifty dollars ($950) shall be considered
petty theft and shall be punished as a misdemeanor.”).
171. Romanowski, 391 P.3d at 637.
172. Id. (quoting VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 2014, supra note 4, at 35, 70, 74).
173. Id. at 637.
174. Gonzales I, 392 P.3d 437 (Cal. 2017).
175. Id. at 440.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 452.
178. Id. at 442; see CAL. PENAL CODE § 484 (West Supp. 2019) (consolidating the three
concepts of larceny, false pretenses, and embezzlement under the single label “theft”).
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definition throughout the entirety of the California Penal Code.179
Therefore, intent to commit “larceny” as used in section 459.5 truly
meant “theft,” which in turn could include entering a commercial
business during open hours with intent to commit other forms of nonlarcenous theft, such as cashing forged checks.180 The court justified
its interpretation with the tenet that voters are assumed to be aware of
all existing laws when they pass an initiative, including special judicial
constructions.181 Therefore “shoplifting” under Proposition 47, the
opinion argued, is intended as “a term of art, which must be
understood as it is defined, not in its colloquial sense.”182 The court
sourced additional support from Proposition 47’s ballot materials,
namely that voters intended the initiative to reduce punishment and
require misdemeanors for non-serious offenses, which indicated that
voters did not view the three underlying forms of theft differently.183
The Gonzales court’s refashioning of a commonly used term did
not sit well with Justices Chin and Liu, who dissented in one of only
three split California Supreme Court opinions on Proposition 47 to
date.184 Reinforcing the link between common understanding and
voter intent, Justice Chin’s dissenting opinion decried that the concept
of shoplifting had been “expand[ed] . . . beyond all recognition” when
voters clearly understood it to mean the stealing of tangible
merchandise from a store.185 Additionally, “autocorrecting” the
narrower concept of “larceny” to signify the broader term of
consolidated “theft” would change the substantive nature of the crimes
themselves, creating potentially absurd results.186 For example, was an
employee sitting in a business minutes before closing with intent to
commit embezzlement now a shoplifter?187 Although mild by most
standards, the existence of any overt conflict in Proposition 47
179. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 484, 490a (“Wherever any law or statute of this state refers to
or mentions larceny, embezzlement, or stealing, said law or statute shall hereafter be read and
interpreted as if the word ‘theft’ were substituted therefor.”).
180. Gonzales I, 392 P.3d at 440.
181. Id. at 445.
182. Id. at 446.
183. Id. at 445–46.
184. See id. at 450–55 (Chin, J., dissenting); see also People v. Valenzuela, 441 P.3d 896 (Cal.
2019); People v. Valencia, 397 P.3d 936 (Cal. 2017).
185. Gonzales I, 392 P.3d at 452–53 (“The ballot materials, a useful source of ascertaining
voter intent . . . demonstrate the voters’ understanding that shoplifting was limited to its common
understanding.”).
186. Id. at 451, 455.
187. Id. at 455.
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jurisprudence is notable, especially in an opinion regarding low-level
property crimes, and speaks to the unorthodox nature of the majority’s
interpretation.188
While the court used a flexible interpretive approach in
Romanowski and Gonzales to allow new types of grand theft-related
conduct to fall under Proposition 47’s resentencing umbrella, it pushed
the envelope even further in People v. Page.189 Previously, only
offenders convicted of the specific enumerated statutes listed in
section 1170.18(a) could apply for resentencing.190 In Page, the court
unanimously decided to liberate future petitioners from that list, so
that offenders charged under other statutes, even within the California
Vehicle Code, could theoretically seek resentencing as a misdemeanor
“in accordance with” one of the enumerated statutes.191
Page involved a petitioner who had applied to resentence a felony
conviction for “joyriding” under California Vehicle Code section
10851 as a misdemeanor because the vehicle was worth less than
$950.192 However, Page’s petition was denied because joyriding did
not appear in the list of enumerated statutes expressly eligible for
resentencing under section 1170.18(a).193 Despite this, the court
decided to allow resentencing because joyriding under California
Vehicle Code section 10851 can involve the subtle distinction of
taking of a vehicle with the intent to steal, versus merely driving a
vehicle post-theft.194 The court reasoned that if the defendant’s
conviction records showed his joyriding crime rested on what was
essentially vehicle theft, he could seek resentencing under section
490.2 for petty theft “regardless of the statutory section under which
the theft was charged.”195
188. The court’s broadening of the concept of “shoplifting” was not infinite, however. In
January 2019, the court held that “entering [a store’s] . . . interior room that is objectively
identifiable as off-limits to the public with intent to steal therefrom is not shoplifting, but instead
remains punishable as burglary.” People v. Colbert, 433 P.3d 536, 537 (Cal. 2019).
189. 406 P.3d 319 (Cal. 2017).
190. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.18(a) (West 2015) (permitting a petitioner to “request
resentencing . . . in accordance with Sections 11350, 11357, or 11377 of the Health and Safety
Code, or Section 459.5, 473, 476a, 490.2, 496, or 666 of the Penal Code, as those sections have
been amended or added by this act”).
191. Page, 406 P.3d at 323–25.
192. Id. at 320–21.
193. Id. Ironically, had the defendant committed grand theft auto for under $950, he would have
been able to seek relief under Proposition 47 without issue under section 490.2, petty theft.
194. Id. at 326.
195. Id. at 325.
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The court justified this vast expansion of offenses eligible for
resentencing with concrete interpretations of specific statutory
language in addition to highlighting the same permissive portions of
the ballot materials as it did in Romanowski and Gonzales. A
straightforward reading of section 490.2’s wording “obtaining any
property by theft” established that joyriding with intent to permanently
steal a car within the $950 value limit easily fit the basic statutory
meaning.196 Furthermore, the court highlighted section 1170.18(a)’s
phrase that a petitioner may request sentencing “in accordance with”
one of the listed statutes to mean that it is not a list of offenses the
petitioner must be charged under but, rather, should be “[u]nderstood
as a list of sections under which defendants are to be resentenced.”197
The fact that Proposition 47 added two previously non-existent
statutes for petty theft and shoplifting, which also appear in the
enumerated list of statutes to be resentenced “in accordance with,”
further reinforced this reading because it would have been impossible
for a petitioner to have been originally charged under one of those laws
prior to the enactment of the initiative.198
The court reinforced its statutory construction with the ballot
materials’ statements that Proposition 47 should be construed
“broadly” and “liberally” to accomplish its goals, and the Legislative
Analyst’s references to “theft of certain property (such as cars)” that
would no longer be charged as felonies “solely because of the property
involved.”199 The court reasoned that “these indicia of the voters’
intent support[ed] an inclusive interpretation”—one that would extend
not only to perpetrators of joyriding but, theoretically, to an entirely
new range of criminal conduct and its corresponding charging statutes
not originally contemplated by Proposition 47.200
B. Restrictive Approach to Perceived Public Safety Threats
In light of the court’s decisions greatly expanding Proposition
47’s scope for property crimes, one might expect that the same
interpretive flexibility would translate to the court’s interpretation of
other issues such as drug possession, resentencing procedures, and
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id. at 324–25.
Id. at 323.
Id. at 323–24.
Id. at 324–25.
Id. at 325.
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other key aspects of the measure. Especially in a post-Page
environment where the court had unshackled Proposition 47’s
resentencing procedure from its enumerated statutes, it seems
reasonable that other aspects of Proposition 47 would also be
“liberally construed.”201
Yet the opposite trend has emerged when the recent California
Supreme Court decisions are viewed as a whole. On questions apart
from low-level property crimes, the court has often restrictively
interpreted voter intent as it relates to the scope of resentencing
procedures, retroactive application of resentencing benefits, and other
issues that affect recidivist or more serious criminals. This is not
shocking. After all, Proposition 47’s uncodified preamble clearly lists
“[ensuring] that people convicted of murder, rape, and child
molestation will not benefit from this act” as the first of its six stated
purposes.202 Furthermore, the exclusion of offenders who have
committed super-strikes is explicitly codified in every statute
Proposition 47 enacted.203
In People v. Morales,204 the court’s very first case analyzing
Proposition 47, the court restricted a benefit to resentenced criminals,
rooted in a straightforward reading of statutory and ballot language.
The petitioner was convicted of felony heroin possession prior to the
enactment of Proposition 47.205 However, Morales was set to serve
three years of PRCS206 instead of his formal sentence of sixteen
months in prison due to 220 days of good conduct credits he had
already accumulated while in custody awaiting adjudication.207 Yet
when Morales successfully petitioned for resentencing under
Proposition 47, section 1170.18(d) nonetheless required him to serve
one year of more-stringent state parole, even though the credits would
have normally applied towards his parole under the preexisting
California Penal Code statute.208
201. VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 2014, supra note 4, at 74.
202. Id. at 70.
203. CAL. PENAL CODE § 490.2(a) (West Supp. 2019); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.18(i) (West
2015).
204. 371 P.3d 592 (Cal. 2016).
205. Id. at 593.
206. See also supra notes 76–78 (distinguishing Post Release Community Supervision and its
role in Realignment policy from state parole).
207. Morales, 371 P.3d at 594.
208. Id. at 595; see CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.18(d); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 2900.5(c)
(West 2011) (stating that good time credits apply to “any period of imprisonment and parole”).
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The court upheld the banned use of good time credits, citing
section 1170.18(d)’s language, “shall be given credit for time served
and shall be subject to parole for one year,” as indication that credits
could apply to reduce a resentenced petitioner’s new misdemeanor
sentence but not the mandatory one year parole period.209 Moreover,
the decision quoted the ballot materials’ statement that “[o]ffenders
who are resentenced would be required to be on state parole for one
year, unless the judge chooses to remove that requirement” as
evidence that voters anxious about the release of former felons were
reassured by mandatory parole period and would not want to curtail a
resentencing court’s discretion.210 Rebutting Morales’s argument that
mandating parole would cost the state more, the court agreed that
although placing fewer resentenced individuals on parole would save
money, “the purpose of saving money does not mean we should
interpret the statute in every way that might maximize any monetary
savings.”211
The Morales court’s analysis, despite turning on a single
preposition, straightforwardly adheres to the statutory and ballot text
and therefore appears fairly self-evident, especially given the anxiety
about early release of prisoners that pervaded the Voter Guide.212
However, contradictions emerge when one examines the Morales
facts more carefully. Primarily, Morales himself was already released
into larger society by virtue of his original PRCS sentence.213 He was
both already under a form of government surveillance and physically
free to harm the public.214 If the court based its reasoning on the
projected fears of “[s]ome voters who were concerned about simply
releasing persons,” placing the petitioner under state parole versus
community supervision would have had minimal, if any, effect.215
Moreover, Morales was set to serve three years of PRCS, whereas now
209. Morales, 371 P.3d at 594–595 (emphasis added).
210. Id. at 596 (“Some voters who were concerned about simply releasing persons who had
committed what had been felonies might have been reassured by this promise, a reassurance that
might have persuaded them to vote for the proposition. We have no reason to believe any voter
intended to curtail or eliminate the court’s discretion to impose parole whenever excess credits
exist, and much reason to believe the opposite.”).
211. Id. at 597 (responding to amici briefs).
212. VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 2014, supra note 4, at 39 (“Prop. 47 will require the release
of thousands of dangerous inmates . . . . These early releases will be virtually mandated by Prop
47.”).
213. Morales, 371 P.3d at 594.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 596.
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he would only serve one year of state parole, gaining two completely
unsupervised years.216 While it is understandable that the court may
not have wanted to set a precedent for other petitioners who, unlike
Morales, were currently behind bars while applying for a change of
sentence, the rationale of voter anxiety over the release of dangerous
inmates falters under the specific case facts.
In addition, the Morales decision overlooks the very real
differences between PRCS and state parole, and the way in which state
parole violations vastly expanded California’s prison population.217
State parole missteps carry more severe penalties than PRCS, which
was created as part of the Realignment policy package specifically
designed to keep offenders from returning to state prison.218 While the
court may reasonably argue that cost of placing resentenced offenders
on state parole for one year is worth the expense given voter
expectations, the impact of low-level offenders committing what are
often the most basic technical violations and returning to state prison
in larger numbers would increase the state prison population,
thwarting the goal of “ensur[ing] that prison spending is focused on
violent and serious offenses.”219 Here, the court does not justify its
prioritizing of inferred voter anxiety regarding prisoner release over
Proposition 47’s equally compelling goal of keeping non-violent
criminals out of state prison, the same rationale the court used to
expand the scope of relief for property crimes.220
In People v. Martinez,221 the court applied a similarly selective
interpretive logic to the resentencing of drug crimes. Martinez was
convicted of drug transportation without intent to sell after police
216. See id. at 594.
217. See Jeffrey Lin et al., Back-end Sentencing and Reimprisonment: Individual,
Organizational, and Community Predictors of Parole Sanctioning Decisions, 48 CRIMINOLOGY
759, 761 (2010), https://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/default/files/publication/
259341/doc/slspublic/j.1745-9125.2010.00201.x.pdf (“By 2005, more than 60 percent of
California prison admissions were individuals returning from parole. . . . Mass incarceration thus
seems to be increasingly a result of the largely hidden dynamic of returning parolees to prison rather
than court-ordered imprisonments for new felony offenses alone.”).
218. Compare
Parole
Conditions,
CAL.
DEP’T
CORR.
&
REHAB.,
https://www.cdcr.ca.gov/parole/parole/parole-conditions (last visited Sept. 29, 2019) (list of
technical violations resulting in a return to state prison), with CAL. PENAL CODE § 3455 (West
Supp. 2019) (PRCS revocation resulting in return to jail or other non-prison sanctions).
219. Morales, 371 P.3d at 597; VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 2014, supra note 4, at 70.
220. See Gonzales I, 392 P.3d 437, 445 (Cal. 2017) (“One of Proposition 47’s primary purposes
is to reduce the number of nonviolent offenders in state prisons, thereby saving money and focusing
prison on offenders considered more serious under the terms of the initiative.”).
221. 413 P.3d 1125 (Cal. 2018).
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discovered him with a plastic bag containing methamphetamine
during a 2007 traffic stop.222 At the time of Martinez’s final conviction
in 2010, only one general felony drug transportation statute existed
under California Health and Safety Code section 11379.223 The
general statute did not distinguish between transportation for personal
use and transportation for distribution and sale.224 However, in 2013,
the California legislature amended the statutory scheme to
recategorize drug transportation without intent to sell as simple drug
possession under California Health and Safety Code section 11377, a
section later expressly reduced to a misdemeanor under Proposition
47 in 2014.225 Therefore, the government would almost surely have
charged Martinez’s criminal act of non-sale drug transportation as a
misdemeanor had it occurred in 2018 when the California Supreme
Court considered the case.226
Like the joyriding petitioner in Page, Martinez sought
resentencing in “accordance with” the simple drug possession, now a
misdemeanor under California Health and Safety Code section 11377,
despite having been originally charged under a non-enumerated
statute.227 Nevertheless, the court denied Martinez’s petition for
resentencing, citing limited retroactivity and normative social
arguments about the nature of drug trafficking crimes.228 To qualify
the denial, the court first addressed its recent decisions in Romanowski
and Page, which expanded resentencing benefits for minor property
crimes.229 The opinion explained that the mere fact that section 11379
is not one of the code sections enumerated in section 1170.18(a) was
“not fatal to Martinez’s petition for resentencing.”230
Still, the court distinguished Page using a limited retroactivity
argument. It observed that Martinez’s particular drug transportation
222. Id. at 1127.
223. Id.
224. Id. (“The transportation element of the offense was satisfied so long as the defendant
knowingly moved the substance a minimal distance.”).
225. Id. (“In 2013, the Legislature narrowed the transportation statute by specifying that ‘[f]or
purposes of this section, “transports” means to transport for sale.’ In light of this amendment to
section 11379, the possession and movement of methamphetamine for personal use, without intent
to sell, can be charged only as a possession offense under section 11377.”).
226. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11377 (West Supp. 2019).
227. Martinez, 413 P.3d at 1128–29.
228. Id. at 1129; see People v. Page, 406 P.3d 319, 323 (Cal. 2017) (citing CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1170.18(a) (West 2015)).
229. Martinez, 413 P.3d at 1128, 1130.
230. Id. at 1128.
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conviction, although the underlying conduct was likely identical to
what is now considered drug possession, was ineligible for
resentencing because Proposition 47’s retroactive resentencing
benefits hinge on the phrase “who would have been guilty of a
misdemeanor under [the act] . . . had [Proposition 47] been in effect at
the time of the offense.”231 Had Proposition 47 been enacted in 2007
when Martinez was arrested with drugs or in 2010 when his conviction
became final, the initiative would have been unable to downgrade
what was then still a blanket drug transportation felony under
California Health and Safety Code section 11379.232 Therefore, the
court reasoned, for the purposes of the statutory analysis, it must only
consider voter intent regarding Proposition 47’s effect on drug
transportation offenses.233
Once the court reframed the issue as Proposition 47’s intended
effect on the separate crime of drug transportation, it handily discarded
Martinez’s claim on several grounds. First, the court observed that the
ballot materials, including the uncodified preamble and Legislative
Analyst’s assessment, “extensively discuss[ed] Proposition 47’s
impact on drug possession offenses” but did not mention drug
transportation at all.234 Therefore, voters must have clearly understood
that drug possession and drug transportation crimes “are distinct and
merit different treatment under the proposition.”235 Second, the court
cited various policy rationales from unrelated precedent to
demonstrate that the movement of drugs from place to place, even
without the intent to sell, posed a greater danger to public safety and
therefore merited greater punishment.236

231. Id.
232. Id. at 1129 (“[H]ad Proposition 47 been in effect at the time of Martinez’s offense, his
criminal conduct still would have amounted to felony drug transportation because none of the
statutes amended or enacted by Proposition 47 altered the offense set forth in section 11379.
Proposition 47’s amendments to sections 11350, 11357, and 11377, all of which concern illegal
possession of various controlled substances including methamphetamine, do not redefine or refer
to unlawful transportation of controlled substances.”).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 1129 (emphasis added).
235. Id.
236. Id. (“[T]he act of transportation substantially increases the risks to the public. Thus, a
prohibition on the simple transportation of drugs affects the transporter’s ability to make sales or
purchases of contraband; it reduces the risks of traffic accidents due to drivers under the influence;
and it arguably even reduces the frequency of personal drug use by discouraging users from
carrying supplies in vehicles. The Legislature continues to punish transportation of contraband for
sale more severely than possession of contraband for sale.” (citations omitted)).
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Last, the court returned to the core presumption that voters
understood existing laws when they enacted Proposition 47.237
Therefore, if voters had intended resentencing to extend to that
specific pocket of pre-2013, non-sale drug transportation felons
including Martinez, the initiative would have expressly covered that
offender group.238 The court used these combined rationales, based
mostly on the initiative’s silence on the subject of drug transportation
crimes, to block resentencing for offenders convicted of criminal
conduct that would have undoubtedly been charged as simple drug
possession had it occurred after 2013.239
Although the court voted unanimously, Justice Liu authored a
thoughtful concurring opinion, questioning whether it was “an
oversight” to exclude non-violent, non-serious offenders such as
Martinez from Proposition 47’s ameliorative reach.240 The
concurrence reasoned that Proposition 47’s scope may have failed to
retroactively include petitioners in Martinez’s specific chronological
sentencing window because in 2014 it was assumed that transportation
without intent to sell would always be charged as drug possession
going forward.241 More significantly, the concurrence argued that
allowing resentencing benefits to a petitioner like Martinez honored
Proposition 47’s core value to “[r]equire misdemeanors instead of
felonies for nonserious, nonviolent crimes like . . . drug
possession.”242 That clear goal, combined with an explicitly
retroactive sentencing procedure laid out in section 1170.18(a) and the
seemingly inadvertent exclusion of a non-serious, non-violent
offender group of drug possessors, indicated that “it is not clear . . .
that the initiative’s proponents or the electorate really anticipated” that
Proposition 47 would deny offenders like Martinez resentencing.243
While the concurrence ultimately stood by the court’s textual
interpretation, Justice Liu’s suggestion that the legislature might want
237. Id.
238. Id. (“Proposition 47 could have been written to reduce to a misdemeanor any drug offense
without intent to sell. But Proposition 47 was not written that way. The electorate reduced felony
drug possession convictions under only three possession statutes, even though it presumably
understood that before 2014, some possessory conduct resulted in felony convictions for unlawful
transportation under former section 11379.” (citations omitted)).
239. Id. at 1128–30.
240. Id. at 1131 (Liu, J., concurring).
241. Id.
242. Id. (citing VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 2014, supra note 4, at 70).
243. Id.
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to revise this potential neglect in Proposition 47’s drafting represents
an important, albeit brief, acknowledgement that a seemingly direct
statutory interpretation could contradict, rather than illuminate, voter
intent.244
C. Mixed Reading of Statutory Retroactivity
In subsequent Proposition 47 decisions, the court continued to
navigate the interpretive tension between reducing punishment for
non-serious and non-violent crimes and an aversion to extending any
benefit to serious or recidivist offenders. Apart from the generally
narrower interpretive strategies discussed in the previous subsection,
the court also utilized the concept of Proposition 47’s retroactive effect
to create a distinction between cases where it granted versus withheld
resentencing benefits to certain offender groups. This, in turn, has
entailed a varied interpretation of In re Estrada,245 the California
precedent that continues to control the retroactive application of
ameliorative criminal statutes.246
Estrada addressed the scenario where a person has committed a
criminal act, but between the act itself and adjudication of the case, an
amended statute lessening punishment comes into force.247 The court
held that “[t]he key date is the date of final judgment.”248 Therefore, a
court should sentence a defendant under the amended statute
mitigating punishment if the statute was enacted prior to his or her
sentence becoming final, meaning all direct appeals were
exhausted.249 This conclusion contradicted the California Penal
Code’s general rule that statutes were presumed to operate

244. Id. (“Although our holding today follows from the text of Proposition 47 . . . .”).
245. 408 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1965).
246. Id. at 950 (“A criminal statute is amended after the prohibited act is committed but before
final judgment by mitigating the punishment. What statute prevails as to the punishment the one in
effect when the act was committed or the amendatory act?”).
247. The Estrada defendant had peacefully escaped confinement at a drug rehabilitation center.
After the criminal escape act, but before the defendant went to trial, the statute governing such
escapes was amended to distinguish between escapes with and without force. The amendment
actively shortened both the term of imprisonment and mandatory prison time before parole
eligibility kicked in for non-force escapees like the defendant. Id. at 950–51.
248. Id. at 952.
249. Id. at 951 (“If the amendatory statute lessening punishment becomes effective prior to the
date the judgment of conviction becomes final then, in our opinion, it, and not the old statute in
effect when the prohibited act was committed, applies.”).
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prospectively and not retrospectively if there were no signs of another
intent.250
Similar to recent Proposition 47 cases, legislative intent was
central to the Estrada court’s reasoning.251 If the legislature did not
expressly state whether an old or new statute should apply, “the
amendatory statute should prevail” because
[w]hen the Legislature amends a statute . . . it has obviously
expressly determined that its former penalty was too severe
and that a lighter punishment is proper . . . It is an inevitable
inference that the Legislature must have intended that the
new statute imposing the new lighter penalty . . . should
apply to every case to which it constitutionally could
apply.252
To continue to use the harsher earlier punishment for a non-final
judgement would mean that “a desire for vengeance” had motivated
the legislature, as opposed to the legitimate criminal punishment
theories of deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation.253 Because
“[t]here is no place in the scheme for punishment for its own sake,”
the court concluded that, when “it is impossible to ascertain the
legislative intent,” an ameliorative statute is presumed to affect all
non-final judgements.254
In People v. Dehoyos,255 the court overrode the Estrada
presumption to deny automatic resentencing to petitioners whose
sentences were not yet finalized, requiring them to instead follow
Proposition 47’s standard resentencing procedure.256 The case
considered whether individuals sentenced prior to November 5, 2014,
but with cases still on appeal, could benefit from an automatic
reduction in sentence versus undergoing the formal process mandated
in section 1170.18(b), including the trial court’s “unreasonable risk of
danger to public safety” assessment.257 Dehoyos had been sentenced
in April 2014 to three years of probation for felony drug possession
250. Id. at 952; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 3 (West 2014) (“No part of it is retroactive, unless
expressly so declared.”).
251. In re Estrada, P.2d at 951.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 951–52.
254. Id. at 952.
255. 412 P.3d 368 (Cal. 2018).
256. Id. at 369.
257. Id. at 370.

(9) 53.1_BURCHUK (DO NOT DELETE)

5/26/2020 3:06 PM

218

[Vol. 53:179

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

under California Health and Safety Code section 11377(a), an offense
Proposition 47 reduced to a misdemeanor only months later.258
Dehoyos rooted her argument for automatic resentencing in a direct
reading of Estrada.259 Accordingly, she requested that the court
automatically convert her sentence to a misdemeanor, bypassing the
formal process, because her sentence was on appeal and she had no
disqualifying super-strike convictions.260 The court rejected her
request.261
In reaching its conclusion, the court utilized a mix of statutory
text and ballot materials to circumvent Estrada.262 First, the Dehoyos
court noted that despite the absence of an express savings clause,
section 1170.18 was “not silent on the question of retroactivity”
because its various provisions describe its retroactive effect on future
sentences, sentences being served, and sentences already completed
“in conspicuous detail.”263 Second, section 1170.18(a)’s resentencing
benefits to offenders “serving a sentence” did not distinguish between
final and non-final sentences.264 Therefore, the ordinary meaning of
“serving” refers to any period after a sentence has been imposed,
regardless of its finality.265 Had Proposition 47’s creators intended to
designate the resentencing procedures for final sentences only, the
opinion argued, the statute and ballot materials could have stated so
clearly.266 Third, Proposition 47’s uncodified preamble’s statement to
“[r]equire a thorough review of criminal history and risk assessment
of any individuals before resentencing” demonstrated that the court’s
258. Id. at 370–71.
259. Id. at 371.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 369.
262. Id. at 372–74.
263. Id. at 372–73 (“Separate provisions articulate the conditions under which the new
misdemeanor penalty provisions apply to completed sentences (§ 1170.18, subds. (f)-(j)), sentences
still being served (id., subds. (a)-(e)), and sentences yet to be imposed (Pen. Code, §§ 459.5, subd.
(a), 473, subd. (b), 476a, subd. (b), 490.2, subd. (a), 496, subd. (a), 666, subd. (a); Health & Saf.
Code, §§ 11350, subd. (a), 11377, subd. (a)).”).
264. Id. at 373–74.
265. Id. It should also be noted that the court has not utilized its interpretation of “serving a
sentence” solely to limit ameliorative relief. In 2019, the court held unanimously in People v. Lara
that petitioners who had committed a crime before Proposition 47’s effective date but had not been
sentenced yet were entitled to automatic resentencing. 438 P.3d 251, 255 (Cal. 2019). In contrast
to Dehoyos, the court observed that the text of the initiative was in fact “silent” with regards to that
specific class of post-conduct but pre-sentencing offenders. Id.
266. Dehoyos, 412 P.3d at 374 (“But it does not follow that we can read ‘serving a sentence’ as
though it instead read ‘serving a final sentence,’ as defendant argues—a conclusion that would
require us to insert language that Proposition 47’s drafters did not see fit to include.”).
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discretionary public safety determination applied broadly to any
persons seeking a reduced sentence.267 These “indicia of legislative
intent,” taken together, convinced the court that the voters did not
intend the Estrada rule to permit automatic resentencing for non-final
judgements.268 In this sense, Proposition 47’s subtle language
“expressly contained its own retroactivity provision” with regard to
the public safety, which, in turn, overruled the normal application of
Estrada precedent.269
In contrast, the court has also used the Estrada rule to vastly
expand relief available to petitioners seeking resentencing.270 For
example, its expansive People v. Buycks271 decision reembraced
Estrada when it held that Proposition 47 could ameliorate previously
imposed sentencing enhancements if the underlying felony had been
reduced to a misdemeanor and the sentence was under appeal on the
date Proposition 47 was enacted.272 Buycks consolidated three
different matters in order to address a variety of collateral felony
sentencing enhancements. 273 These enhancements included the
increased penalties for a new felony committed while released on bail
for a previous felony, for having served a prior felony prison term, and
for the failure to appear for a felony charge.274 The extension of
Proposition 47 benefits to collateral enhancements is especially
significant given their role in the extreme ratcheting up of sentencing
laws since the 1970s and resulting prison growth.275
The Buycks court focused its analysis on section 1170.18(k)’s allencompassing language that, once reclassified, a former felony “shall

267. Id. at 373 (quoting VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 2014, supra note 4, at 70).
268. Id.
269. People v. Buycks, 422 P.3d 531, 542 (Cal. 2018).
270. See id. at 541–46.
271. 422 P.3d 531, 542 (Cal. 2018).
272. Id. at 535–36 (“[R]elief is limited to judgments that were not final at the time the initiative
took effect on November 5, 2014.”).
273. Id. at 535.
274. Id.; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.1(b) (West Supp. 2019) (felony while released on
bail); CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.5(b) (prior prison term); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1320.5 (failure to
appear for a felony charge). It should be noted that, in the end, the court held that Proposition 47
could not reduce an enhancement for failure to appear under section 1320.5 “because a section
1320.5 offense is not premised on the conviction status of the felony for which the defendant
failed to appear . . . . [A]t the time of his failure to appear, [the petitioner] was charged with a
felony, notwithstanding the fact that the felony was ultimately reduced to a misdemeanor . . . .”
Buycks, 422 P.3d at 538–39.
275. See supra Section II(A).

(9) 53.1_BURCHUK (DO NOT DELETE)

5/26/2020 3:06 PM

220

[Vol. 53:179

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

be considered a misdemeanor for all purposes.”276 Observing that
Proposition 47 does not directly address enhancements, the court
substituted section 1170.18(k)’s wording as a guide.277 Furthermore,
while section 1170.18(k) clearly indicates that newly reduced
misdemeanors will no longer generate future felony enhancements, it
does not mention enhancements imposed prior to the reduction of a
felony to a misdemeanor.278
To bridge this gap, the court read section 1170.18(k) in relation
to the statutory scheme as broad enough to retroactively mitigate an
enhancement imposed before a felony was reduced to a
misdemeanor.279 Yet the court limited this ameliorative provision to
affect only non-final judgements under Estrada.280 In reading section
1170.18(k) retroactively, the court observed that the section was
closely linked to sections 1170.18(a) and (f) that explicitly featured
backward-looking provisions so that section 1170.18(k), too, “was
undeniably intended to have a retroactive effect.”281 Moreover,
because Proposition 47 was “designed to have an ameliorative effect
on punishment of offenses no longer deemed egregious enough to be
handled as felonies,” section 1170.18(k)’s “for all purposes” language
should apply “as broadly as possible,” except as constrained by
Estrada.282 Although not as radical as the mitigation of all felony276. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.18(k) (West 2015); Buycks, 422 P.3d at 539 (emphasis added).
277. Buycks, 422 P.3d at 539. This approach contrasts with other Proposition 47 opinions where
the court interpreted silence on a specific issue as a signal that voters did not intend Proposition 47
to function a certain way. Compare id. (“Although no provision enacted by Proposition 47
expressly addresses whether the measure has any mitigating effect on felony-based
enhancements[,] . . . section 1170.18, subdivision (k), which was enacted by that initiative, is
relevant to the issue.”), with People v. Martinez, 413 P.3d 1125, 1129 (Cal. 2018) (“Neither
mentions drug transportation offenses. We infer that the electorate reasonably could have
understood that drug possession and drug transportation crimes are distinct.”), People v. C.B. (In
re C.B.), 425 P.3d 40, 44 (Cal. 2018) (“Nothing in the text of section 1170.18 explicitly applies to
juveniles.”), People v. Adelmann, 416 P.3d 786, 790 (Cal. 2018) (“Nothing in the language of
Proposition 47, or any of the statutes it amended, mention the probationary transfer scheme . . . .”),
and People v. Morales, 371 P.3d 592, 596 (Cal. 2016) (“It says nothing about credit for time
served.”).
278. Buycks, 422 P.3d at 540.
279. Id. at 541–42.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 542; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.18(a) (“[W]ho would have been guilty of a
misdemeanor under the act that added this section . . . had this act been in effect at the time of the
offense . . . .”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.18(f) (“[W]ho would have been guilty of a misdemeanor
under this act had this act been in effect at the time of the offense . . . .”).
282. Buycks, 422 P.3d at 542, 545 (quoting People v. Conley, 373 P.3d 435, 440 (Cal. 2016)).
The court also carefully distinguishes the inapplicability of the Estrada rule in Dehoyos from
Buycks because in Dehoyos section 1170.18(b)’s “serving a sentence” and the ballot materials’ “any
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sentencing enhancements since the beginning of time, the court’s
widening of Proposition 47’s scope to aid recidivist offenders in any
form marked a significant departure from California’s extremely
punitive sentencing practices.283
Aside from “logically” extending resentencing relief to
enhancements, the Buycks court made several sweeping statements
about Proposition 47’s scope.284 It declared that Proposition 47
represented a “universal reclassification of certain felonies to
misdemeanors.”285 Moreover, it stated that “Proposition 47 as a
whole . . . is intended to ameliorate criminal punishment” and
“intended to reform the needs of the criminal law.”286 The court even
touched on the fiscal purpose of Proposition 47, linking the reduction
of the prison population to cost savings and rehabilitative
programming.287
Yet it is interesting to observe that a championing of ameliorative
values did not entirely eclipse public safety concerns. The court
pointedly distinguished its reasoning Dehoyos and justified its
expanded reading of “for all purposes” in Buycks by clarifying that the
initiative could mitigate an enhancement only after the court had
performed the risk of danger to public safety assessment contained in
the formal resentencing process.288 Because section 1170.18(k)
follows the successful completion of the statutory resentencing
procedure laid out in subsections 1170.18(a) and (b), it would not
interfere with this essential safeguard promised to voters.289 In this
sense, the generous interpretation in Buycks still delicately rested upon
the more cautious reading of Proposition 47 exhibited in previous
decisions.290

individuals” language creates “its own retroactivity provision” to supplant Estrada in order to
impose the formal resentencing procedure on non-final sentences. People v. Dehoyos, 412 P.3d
368, 374 (Cal. 2018) (quoting VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 2014, supra note 4, at 70); see Buycks,
422 P.3d at 542.
283. Supra Section II(A).
284. Buycks, 422 P.3d at 546.
285. Id. at 545.
286. Id. at 542, 545.
287. Id. at 546 (“Permitting defendants to ameliorate, under Estrada, their nonfinal judgments
involving felony-based enhancements and felony-based offenses grounded on those reduced
offenses would generate cost savings by reducing the incarceration terms for those offenders.”).
288. Id. at 543.
289. See id.
290. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 244.
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In a recent progressive turn, the court expanded its Buycks
“misdemeanors for all purposes” framework beyond enhancements to
invalidate a petitioner’s separate but associated “street terrorism”
conviction.291 In People v. Valenzuela,292 a five-to-two majority held
that downgrading Valenzuela’s theft of a $200 bicycle also dismissed
his associated section 186.22(a) “street terrorism” conviction, an
offense which contained the essential element of “willful promotion,
furtherance, or assistance in any felonious criminal conduct by
members of [a] gang.”293 With the original theft conduct no longer
felonious, the court found that the street terrorism conviction could not
stand because Proposition 47 had negated an essential element of the
crime.294 Therefore, Valenzuela was entitled to a “full resentencing”
under Proposition 47 that included ameliorative relief for the distinct
yet dependent gang offense.295 The Valenzuela decision is significant
not only because some of California’s harshest sentencing reforms
have targeted street gangs but also because gangs have remained a
socially taboo subject.296 The court’s characterization of the Buycks
holding as a “full resentencing” rule, coupled with its emphasis on
downgrading underlying criminal conduct, seems to foreshadow
promising future expansions of the Buycks “for all purposes”
concept.297
D. Showdown Over Voter Intent: People v. Valencia
While the California Supreme Court’s Proposition 47
jurisprudence clearly exhibits ideological tensions between
amelioration of punishment and public safety in a rapidly changing
291. People v. Valenzuela, 441 P.3d 896, 898, 903 (Cal. 2019).
292. 441 P.3d 896 (Cal. 2019).
293. Id. at 898–900 (emphasis added) (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(a) (West 2014)).
294. Id. at 904–05.
295. Id.
296. In 1988, the legislature added section 186.22(a) as part of the Street Terrorism and
Enforcement (STEP) Act, which created various new gang-related offenses and enhancements. See
id. at 900. Enacted to “seek the eradication of criminal activity by street gangs,” the STEP Act has
been criticized for being unconstitutionally vague and disproportionately applied to minority
groups. Id. (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.21); see also Martin Baker, Stuck in the Thicket:
Struggling with Interpretation and Application of California’s Anti-Gang STEP Act, 11 BERKELEY
J. CRIM. L. 101, 106–07 (2006) (contending that the STEP Act is unconstitutionally vague); Sara
Lynn Van Hofwegen, Note, Unjust and Ineffective: A Critical Look at California’s STEP Act, 18
S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 679, 681–86 (2009) (discussing the STEP Act’s disproportionate
application to minority groups).
297. Valenzuela, 441 P.3d at 899–900, 902–03 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.18(k) (West
2015)).
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justice reform landscape, it never explicitly addressed these conflicts
but for one exceptional case, People v. Valencia.298 At over seventy
pages, the opinion featured a concurrence and two lengthy dissenting
opinions.299 Valencia remarkably laid bare contentious debates
regarding the overall direction of California’s sentencing reforms.300
The decision also deeply questioned the underlying concept of judicial
interpretation of voter intent from ballot materials and, in turn, the
essential role of ballot initiatives in California’s democracy.301
In Valencia, the court examined the seemingly obscure legal
question of whether Proposition 47’s narrower definition of “danger
to public safety” could apply to petitioners seeking resentencing under
Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act.302 Sandwiched between
Realignment and Proposition 47, Proposition 36 was overwhelmingly
approved by voters on November 6, 2012.303 Like its successor, the
measure emerged in a rare moment of political compromise and
amidst an election discourse centered on cost savings and refocusing
resources on punishment for the most serious offenders.304 Proposition
36 barred the imposition of a life sentence when a third-strike offense
was non-serious and non-violent so that now courts would sentence
the low-level third offense as a second strike, imposing only double
the base term.305 Proposition 36 also created a retroactive resentencing
procedure similar to Proposition 47’s, allowing non-serious third298. 397 P.3d 936 (Cal. 2017).
299. Id.
300. Id. at 979 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting).
301. Id. at 987 (“Lawmaking by ballot initiative is so fundamental to California’s democracy
that . . . [v]oter enactments are to be afforded legitimacy commensurate to that which is furnished
to enactments by our Legislature, and our respect for the doctrine of separation of powers should
not wane when we encounter a voter-enacted statute.”).
302. Id. at 940 (majority opinion). The question of cross-applicability was particularly obscure
because Proposition 36’s two-year resentencing window only overlapped for two days after
Proposition 47 came into effect, although the deadline could be extended for “showing of good
cause.” Id. at 951; see CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.126.
303. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE FOR 2012, GENERAL
ELECTION 48–53, 105–10 (2012), https://repository.uchastings.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
2319&context=ca_ballot_props [hereinafter VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 2012]; see also CAL.
SEC’Y OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE 67–69 (2012), https://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/sov/2012general/sov-complete.pdf (stating that Proposition 36 passed by 69.3 percent of the vote and a
majority in each of California’s 58 counties, a larger majority than Proposition 47).
304. HADAR AVIRAM, CHEAP ON CRIME: RECESSION ERA POLITICS AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN PUNISHMENT 138–44 (2015).
305. VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 2012, supra note 303, at 8, 48 (“Revises [Three Strikes] law
to impose life sentence only when a new felony conviction is serious or violent.”); see CAL. PENAL
CODE § 667(e)(2) (West Supp. 2019); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(c) (West 2015).
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strike offenders to petition for resentencing within two years of the
law’s enactment.306 Like Proposition 47, a judge could block
resentencing if a petitioner was found to be an “unreasonable risk of
danger to public safety,” although Proposition 36’s resentencing
statute, section 1170.126, left the concept undefined.307
As with many cases interpreting Proposition 47, the analysis in
Valencia hinged on a single turn of phrase. At issue was “[a]s used
throughout this code,” the introductory clause to section 1170.18(c)’s
narrower construction of “unreasonable risk of danger to public
safety.”308 Unlike Proposition 36, section 1170.18 defined the term
more narrowly to mean the direct risk that a resentenced individual
would commit a future super-strike felony.309 The majority held that
the narrower definition of a public safety risk did not apply throughout
the entire California Penal Code, including to Proposition 36
offenders, as its ordinary meaning would suggest.310 Instead, “[a]s
throughout this code” was rendered “ambiguous” when the court
considered Proposition 47 as a whole, including contradictory
messages in the ballot materials excluding serious offenders.311
For the majority, section 1170.18(c)’s ambiguity stemmed from
various statutory nuances.312 These included the use of the term “the
petitioner” versus “a petitioner” within the statute, in addition to
section 1170.18(c)’s placement behind subsections 1170.18(a) and
(b), which formally laid out Proposition 47’s resentencing
procedure.313 Furthermore, Proposition 47 had promised in its
uncodified preamble to “[r]equire misdemeanors . . . for nonserious
and nonviolent crimes” and to ensure sentences for those previously
convicted of “dangerous crimes,” such as “rape, murder, and child

306. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.126.
307. Id. § 1170.126(f), (g). Although a judge would still assess risk based on a petitioner’s
conviction history, prison disciplinary record, and other factors it sees fit, just like Proposition 47.
See id. § 1170.18.
308. People v. Valencia, 397 P.3d 936, 953 (Cal. 2017); see also CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1170.18(c) (“As used throughout this code, ‘unreasonable risk of danger to public safety’ means
an unreasonable risk that the petitioner will commit a new violent felony within the meaning of
clause (iv) of subparagraph (C) of paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of Section 667.” (emphasis
added)).
309. Valencia, 397 P.3d at 960.
310. Id. at 944.
311. Id. at 943–44.
312. Id. at 946–47.
313. Id.; CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.18(c).
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molestation are not changed.” 314 For the court, that language clearly
indicated that section 1170.18(c)’s tailored definition was intended to
affect only Proposition 47 petitioners, and no other group.315 The court
argued that voters clearly did not expect “felons with recidivist
convictions for serious or violent felonies” to benefit from any
provision of Proposition 47, as evidenced by the wording “serious
crimes” and “dangerous crimes” in the ballot materials.316 The
majority thus drew a sharp distinction between Proposition 36 and
Proposition 47 offender groups, framing the former as particularly
threatening despite Proposition 36’s similar focus on non-serious and
non-violent third-strike offenses.317
After diagnosing the ambiguity of the statutory text to negate a
plain reading, the court returned again to the extrinsic ballot materials
to discern Proposition 47 voters’ expectations regarding three-strikes
offenders.318 The majority pointed out that the Attorney General and
Legislative Analyst did not “make any reference to the Three Strikes
Law, the Three Strikes Reform Act, three strike inmates, or life
sentences,” nor did they detail a resentencing procedure for the
Proposition 36 group or its projected fiscal impact.319 The ballot
materials’ silence clearly indicated that the expert Legislative Analyst,
Attorney General, and, most certainly, the voters, were unaware of,
and did not intend, a potential benefit, including release, for serious
and violent third-strike offenders.320 Therefore, it reasoned, the
narrower definition of “danger to public safety” did not apply to

314. Valencia, 397 P.3d at 947–48; see VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 2014, supra note 4, at 70.
315. Valencia, 397 P.3d at 947–48.
316. Id. at 948 (“Thus, contrary to Proposition 47’s Purpose and Intent, three strike inmates
previously convicted of nonforcible rape or molestation of a child over the age of 14 would stand
to benefit under Proposition 47’s definition of “an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.”).
317. Id. (“By design, those convicted under either the former Three Strikes law or the amended
version enacted by Proposition 36 are persons convicted of dangerous crimes and have prior
convictions for various violent or serious crimes. These uncodified introductory provisions,
therefore, are inconsistent with any intention to make the resentencing provisions of the Three
Strikes Reform Act more favorable to the resentencing and release of three strike inmates, who are
felons with recidivist convictions for serious or violent felonies.”).
318. Id. at 956.
319. Id. at 949–50. It is interesting that the opinion frames the Proposition 36 petitioner
population as tainted by the three-strikes sentencing scheme, versus less culpable in light of a nonserious final strike.
320. Id. at 952.
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Proposition 36. 321 The broader resentencing benefit rightfully applied
only to the Proposition 47 offender group.322
The majority’s analysis then took a sharp turn in a subsection
entitled, “The Presumptions Concerning an Initiative Adopted by
Voters.”323 It attacked two core interpretive tenets: that voters
carefully consider the text of ballot initiatives and vote intelligently,
and that they understand preexisting laws when they enact an
initiative.324 As for voting intelligently, the court called the
presumption that voters study the detailed text of initiatives a
“fiction.”325 Instead, it observed that voters depend on the professional
summaries of the Attorney General and Legislative Analyst to prevent
“voter confusion and manipulation.”326 Therefore, if those legal
specialists had overlooked the connection between different uses of
“unreasonable risk of danger to public safety,” a phrase that appears
in Propositions 36 and 47 and nowhere else in the Penal Code, the
average voter was certainly clueless.327 Regarding knowledge of
existing laws, the court similarly found that voters lack the adequate
time and knowledge necessary to recognize patterns in previously
enacted statutes without help from the Voter Information Guide.328
Framing the ballot materials as the true source of voter awareness
versus merely an indication of it, the Valencia court concluded that it
could not infer voter intent “where there was nothing to enlighten it in
the first instance.”329
Justices Liu and Cuéllar authored separate but similar dissents
that vehemently protested not only the majority’s textual analysis but
its fundamental assumptions about the purpose of Proposition 47, the
role of ballot initiatives, and California’s sentencing history

321. Id. at 951.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 952–55.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 954 (“Defendants and our dissenting colleagues find these circumstances
unremarkable and engage in the fiction that we should still apply the presumption that the voters
thoroughly study and understand the content of complex initiative measures, even though the
implications for three strikes resentencing were apparently opaque to the Attorney General and the
Legislative Analyst. They were almost certainly opaque to the average voter as well.”).
326. Id.
327. Id. (“[U]nless [they] had exhaustively sifted through the voluminous Penal Code in order
to find the single other reference to the phrase [located in section 1170.126].”).
328. Id. at 955.
329. Id. at 956.
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generally.330 First and foremost, the dissents criticized the majority’s
decision to ignore the plain language of section 1170.18(c) and instead
delve into reading ballot materials as a way to resolve the statute’s
purported ambiguity.331 Both dissents forcefully argued that the phrase
“as used throughout this code” was not ambiguous within the language
of the statute or incompatible with the underlying purpose of
Proposition 47.332 Both also emphasized Proposition 47’s crucial goals
of “concentrating state corrections spending on the most dangerous
offenders” and “increasing investment in crime prevention, victim
services, and mental health and drug treatment to reduce
recidivism.”333 The majority gave short shrift to these central purposes
to instead prioritize barring relief to sex offenders, rapists, and other
feared criminals, which was only one of Proposition 47’s six official
purposes.334
Regarding serious offenders, both dissents characterized the
target populations of Propositions 36 and 47 as “not wholly
distinct.”335 The dissent written by Justice Liu pointed out that like
Proposition 36 offenders, Proposition 47 petitioners could have past
convictions that were violent or serious, so long as they were not
super-strikes.336 The dissent by Justice Cuéllar also observed that, if
an inmate’s non-serious third strike offense that was also an
enumerated misdemeanor covered by Proposition 47, that individual

330. Id. at 964–89 (Liu, J., dissenting) (Cuéllar, J., dissenting).
331. Id. at 967 (Liu, J., dissenting) (“The analytical framework for making that choice consists
of the rules governing when to follow and when to depart from plain meaning, not the rules for
resolving statutory ambiguity.”); id. at 989 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting) (“It is a well-settled principle
of statutory interpretation that, where both text and purpose are clear, courts shall not endeavor to
rewrite language of a ballot measure.”).
332. Id. at 967 (Liu, J., dissenting); id. at 984 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting) (“[T]he phrase ‘the
petitioner’ plainly has relevance elsewhere in the Penal Code, specifically in the Three Strikes
Reform Act. Those words, ‘[a]s used throughout this Code,’ would serve an unintelligible function
if section 1170.18, subdivision (c)’s definition were to pertain only to the Proposition 47
petitioner.”).
333. Id. at 969 (Liu, J., dissenting); id. at 977 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting).
334. Id. at 968–69 (Liu, J., dissenting) (“[O]ne reason courts do not assign much weight to
preamble language relative to operative provisions is that such language . . . typically includes
multiple purposes that point in different directions.”).
335. Id. at 969–70; id. at 981 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting).
336. Id. at 969 (Liu, J., dissenting) (“It is true that inmates eligible for resentencing under
Proposition 36 have been convicted of violent or serious felonies. But that is also true of many
inmates eligible for resentencing under Proposition 47, which excludes only persons who have been
convicted of a ‘super strike’ or a registrable sex offense.”).
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could request a reduction of sentence under either or both
initiatives.337
The dissents emphasized that both Propositions 36 and 47 shared
the same broad remedial purpose as part of a wider justice reform
project aimed at low-level offenders.338 Most notably, these opinion
passages are the court’s only Proposition 47 jurisprudence in which it
directly acknowledged California’s past sentencing excesses. For
example, Justice Cuéllar’s dissent spent almost an entire page
detailing the history of Three Strikes, prison overcrowding, Brown v.
Plata, and Realignment.339 Describing a turning point when
“California voters then began using the initiative process to reform
some of the most punitive features of the criminal justice system,”
Justice Cuéllar underscored the common goals shared by Propositions
36 and 47. 340
The dissent penned by Justice Liu also highlighted a new era of
reform, arguing that both Californians and the wider United States
electorate “have had second thoughts about our past criminal justice
policies.”341 Justice Liu’s dissent also noted a troubling double
standard. For decades, the court had faithfully interpreted Three
Strikes laws according to their plain statutory meaning without
referencing outside ballot materials.342 Therefore, Justice Liu argued
the court must “apply the same interpretive approach to this
ameliorative statute that we applied to the punitive statutes of an
earlier era.”343
Justice Cuéllar not only condemned the majority’s “implausibly
cramped reading of Proposition 47’s purposes” but also connected its

337. Id. at 981 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting).
338. Id. at 977, 981, 985 (“These declared purposes of reallocating prison spending to the most
dangerous criminals and allowing others to pursue resentencing would be advanced by permitting
Three Strikes Reform Act petitioners to demonstrate that—under the same forward-looking risk
assessment employed under Proposition 47—they do not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to
public safety.”).
339. Id. at 979.
340. Id.; see also id. at 977 (Liu, J., dissenting) (“Many voters may have reasonably believed
that inmates whose third strike was neither serious nor violent should not have received 25-yearsto-life sentences . . . .”).
341. Id. at 976 (“Fiscal, moral, religious, and public safety considerations have motivated an
unusually wide spectrum of leaders to reexamine penal laws and sentencing practices.”).
342. Id. at 964 (“For over two decades, we have applied the Three Strikes law in accordance
with its plain meaning, and we have done so regardless of whether the text, history, or ballot
materials addressed the particular application of the statute at issue.”).
343. Id. at 977.
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analysis to a dangerous disregard for the ballot initiative’s role in
California government.344 The dissents argued that the majority’s sidestepping of the plain meaning of “as throughout this code” to imply
that voters were caught off-guard by the Voter Information Guide’s
silence regarding three-strikes inmates was misguided for two
reasons.345 First, ballot materials, like the uncodified preamble and
explanations by the Attorney General and Legislative Analyst are
“indisputably incomplete summaries.”346 Due to space, time, and word
constraints, these materials supply “informational triage” aimed at
fostering only adequate voter understanding.347 Both dissents
emphasized that, because ballot materials are so limited, and the laws
in our democracy so complex, precise knowledge of the voters’
subjective understanding of a measure is likely impossible.348
However, whether voters literally study and understand initiatives or
not, courts do not have the authority to interpret initiatives with any
less deference than a legislative statute, especially if they ignore a
statute’s plain meaning.349
Second, the dissents criticized the court’s reinterpretation of
section 1170.18(c) as a severe judicial overreach.350 Justice Cuéllar’s
dissent forcefully stated that the majority “unjustifiably augments the
judicial power” to modify a duly enacted statute based on a court’s
own preferences.351 Justice Liu’s dissent used similar phrasing,
forewarning that “[i]f we can rewrite statutes on the ground that the
voters were not aware of what they were enacting, there will be no end
to the mischief that courts . . . can inflict on the initiative process.”352
Thus, because voters assume the role of a legislature, an override of
344. Id. at 978 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting).
345. Id. at 976 (Liu, J., dissenting) (“The court today concludes that the drafters of Proposition
47 pulled a fast one on an uninformed public.”); id. at 985–96 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting).
346. Id. at 976 (Liu, J., dissenting); id. at 986 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting); see also id. at 985
(Cuéllar, J., dissenting) (“Official ballot materials are not detailed legal memoranda, nor can we
command they discuss every nuance or legal issue an initiative may touch.”).
347. Id. at 974 (Liu, J., dissenting).
348. E.g., id. at 988 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting) (“[T]he subjective, exact thoughts of the voters
casting ballots for the initiative . . . .”); id. at 989 (“It is one of democracy’s recurring challenges
that the rules and standards governing society—whether enacted by legislation or initiative—are
often enormously complicated in both their content and effect.”).
349. Id. at 988 (“When we analyze a statute, a particularly compelling mix of humility and
analytical clarity should prevent us from implying that we are articulating legislators’ or voters’
subjective states of mind.”).
350. E.g., id. at 967 (Liu, J., dissenting); id. at 978 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting).
351. Id. at 982 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting).
352. Id. at 971 (Liu, J., dissenting).
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duly enacted initiative text violates the doctrine of separation of
powers, threatening the balance of power in California’s
democracy.353
In 2017, Valencia was only the fifth California Supreme Court
opinion interpreting Proposition 47, and its influence on the court’s
subsequent jurisprudence on the initiative’s scope remains unclear.
Mixed holdings predated Valencia, including the expansive property
readings in Gonzales (non-larcenous shoplifting) and Romanowski
(access card data), and the restrictive holding in Morales (parole
requirement).354 Yet apart from Valencia, the court only issued two
other split decisions on the subject of Proposition 47.355 The court also
never again openly questioned voter intelligence, but neither did it
follow up on the dissents’ characterization of ballot materials as
inherently flawed interpretive aids, and it continued to consistently
employ them throughout future decisions.356
Instead, the court continued on a similarly contradictory path,
issuing restrictive decisions in Dehoyos (automatic resentencing) and
Martinez (drug possession), and liberal decisions in Page (nonenumerated statutes), Buycks (enhancements), and Valenzuela (street
terrorism).357 As discussed earlier, the contradictory interpretive
rationales that the court used to block benefits to feared offender
populations, as well as the varied readings of the same ballot materials
used to support an “inclusive interpretation” with regard to property
crimes, demonstrate a significant pattern.358 These mixed judicial
interpretations reveal that when the court is faced with Proposition
47’s contradictory goals of lowering penalties for minor crimes,
saving funds by reducing the inmate population, and blocking
resentencing for more serious offenders, public safety fears often
predominate.
V. CONCLUSION
The court’s often narrow interpretation of Proposition 47 to the
exclusion of other low-level offender populations is problematic for
several reasons. Primarily, it continually holds the desire to block any
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.

Id. at 987 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting).
Supra Section IV(A)–(B).
People v. Valenzuela, 441 P.3d 896 (Cal. 2019).
Id. at 896, 901.
Supra Section IV(A)–(C).
People v. Page, 406 P.3d 319, 325 (Cal. 2017).

(9) 53.1_BURCHUK (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

5/26/2020 3:06 PM

INTERPRETING PROP. 47’S AMELIORATIVE SCOPE

231

mitigation of punishment for “people convicted of dangerous crimes
like rape, murder, and child molestation” over the equally worthy goal
to “maximize alternatives for nonserious, nonviolent crime and to
invest the savings generated from this act into prevention and support
programs.”359 While Proposition 47 clearly presents many conflicting
aims, the court has not yet offered a coherent textual or legal
justification for why anxiety about serious crime should prevail
against the more urgent goals of ameliorating needlessly harsh
punishment for low level crimes and reducing the inmate population.
In its insistence on executing a straight statutory analysis informed by
ballot materials, the court often ignores the reform movement that
gave rise to Proposition 47. If California voters’ primary goal was to
continue punishing serious offenders, why amend the last forty years’
sentencing laws at all?
California’s new era of justice reform continues to face grave
challenges. State prisons currently operate collectively at 131 percent
of design capacity, just below the Brown v. Plata threshold of 137
percent.360 Yet, of the thirty-five total prison facilities, sixteen
currently operate at populations over the threshold, with eight as
crowded as 150 percent of capacity or higher.361
As a result of overcrowding and other systemic failures, mental
health care inside of California prisons remains abysmal. The 1990
Coleman362 litigation by mentally ill inmates and the reporting
relationship with the special master it created were finally winding
down in 2018 when Dr. Michael Golding, the chief psychiatrist of the
entire California prison system, filed a major whistleblower report in
October 2018.363 The 161-page document laid out in careful detail the
methods the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
(CDCR) had used to game the self-reporting system to make it appear
359. People v. Dehoyos, 412 P.3d 368, 373 (Cal. 2018); see VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 2014,
supra note 4, at 70.
360. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 501 (2011); Weekly Report of Population, CAL. DEP’T
CORR. & REHAB. (Feb. 12, 2020), https://www.cdcr.ca.gov/research/wp-content/uploads/sites/174/
2020/02/Tpop1d200212.pdf
361. Weekly Report of Population, supra note 360 (only three prison facilities operate at under
100 percent capacity).
362. See Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282 (E.D. Cal. 1995); see also Coleman v. Brown,
No. 2:90-cv-0520 KMJ DB P, 2018 WL 5828696 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2018).
363. Declaration of Michael Golding, M.D., Coleman v. Brown, No. 2:90-cv-0520-KMJ-DB
(E.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2018), ECF No. 5988; CDCR Mental Health Sys. Report, Coleman v. Brown,
No. 2:90-CV-00520 KMJ-DB (E.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2018), ECF No. 5988-1 [hereinafter Golding
Report].
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that inmates received adequate and timely psychiatric care when this
was far from true.364 The report documented a reality where only 30
percent of psychiatry patients were seen confidentially or on time, but
the percentage appeared much higher because CDCR staff failed to
record appointments that inmates declined or did not show up for, in
addition to other timeline manipulations.365 The report also described
terrible conditions where psychiatrists evaluated severely mentally
disabled patients through slatted cell doors or on public prison yards,
with one report of a psychiatrist in an administrative segregation unit
visiting seven towel-clad patients in fifteen minutes.366 In one
gruesome event, understaffing of psychiatrists left a severely
psychotic inmate alone and unmedicated, and she tore out and
consumed her own eyeball.367
In response, federal district court Judge Kimberley Mueller, who
was supervising the final phases of the Coleman litigation, appointed
a neutral expert to investigate the accusations against CDCR.368 On
April 22, 2019, the law firm Gibson Dunn released the Neutral Expert
Report.369 The report recorded problematic practices in multiple areas
of patient treatment and reporting but did not find intentional
deception on the part of CDCR.370 Nonetheless, Judge Mueller
ordered an evidentiary hearing to investigate whether misleading
information was presented to the court, which was set to take place in
September 2019.371
More optimistically, in the years since Proposition 47’s passage,
California’s voters and legislature have continued to move forward
with new justice reform initiatives aimed at reducing the prison
population. In 2016, the voters passed Proposition 57 by a 64.5 percent
majority.372 That initiative expanded parole eligibility for non-violent

364. Golding Report, supra note 363, at 1–14.
365. Id. at 1–14, 62–63.
366. Id. at 80–81.
367. Id. at 83–85.
368. Amended Order for Neutral Expert at 1, Coleman v. Brown, No. 2:90-cv-00520-KMJ-DB
(E.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2019).
369. Neutral Expert Report, Coleman v. Newsom, No. 2:90-cv-00520-KMJ-DB (E.D. Cal.
May 3, 2019).
370. Id. at 2.
371. Order at 2, Coleman v. Newsom, No. 2:90-cv-00520-KMJ-DB (E.D. Cal. June 14, 2019).
372. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE FOR 2016, GENERAL
ELECTION 54–57, 141–46 (2016), https://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2016/general/en/pdf/completevig.pdf; see also CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE 68–70 (2016),
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offenders, permitted the expansion of credits for good behavior and
education in prison, and blocked the automatic transfer of fourteenyear-olds to be tried in adult court.373 The California legislature has
also passed numerous new laws reducing punishment and giving
certain offenders the opportunity for early release.374
However, a new initiative has gained sufficient signatures to
appear on the November 3, 2020 General Election ballot that would
reverse key provision of Propositions 47.375 The proposed Reducing
Crime and Keeping California Safe Act seeks to “[r]eform theft laws
to . . . restore accountability for serial thieves and organized theft
rings.”376 If approved, the measure would amend section 459.5’s
definition of “shoplifting” to mean “steal retail property or
merchandise,” and specifically exclude forgery, access card
information theft, and joyriding, in an effort to counteract the court’s
expansive treatment of property crimes under Proposition 47.377 The
measure also proposes new sections: section 490.3, a wobbler for
“serial theft” based on two or more thefts over $250, and section 490.4,
a wobbler for “organized retail theft” for individuals working in
concert to steal merchandise worth over $250.378 The opposition that
has built against even the least controversial property crime aspects of
Proposition 47 is sobering.

https://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/sov/2016-general/sov/2016-complete-sov.pdf (stating Proposition
57 prevailed by 64.5 percent majority).
373. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE FOR 2016, GENERAL
ELECTION 11 (2016), https://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2016/general/en/pdf/complete-vig.pdf.
374. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 189(e) (West 2014) (new felony murder rule); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1170 (West 2015) (retroactive resentencing); CAL. PENAL CODE § 3550 (West Supp. 2019)
(medical parole); CAL. PENAL CODE § 3051 (youth offender parole hearings for offenders who
were twenty-five years old or younger during commission of a crime).
375. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, FISCAL IMPACT ESTIMATE REPORT OF INITIATIVE NO.
17-0044, AMENDMENT NO. 1, at 3 (2017), https://www.oag.ca.gov/system/files/initiatives/pdfs/
fiscal-impact-estimate-report%2817-0044%29_0.pdf (“This measure amends state law to (1)
increase penalties for certain theft-related crimes, (2) change the existing nonviolent offender
release consideration process, (3) change community supervision practices, and (4) require DNA
collection from adults convicted of certain misdemeanors.”); Eligible Statewide Initiative
Measures, CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ballot-measures/initiative-andreferendum-status/eligible-statewide-initiative-measures (last visited Sept. 29, 2019) (“Authorizes
felony charges for specified theft crimes currently chargeable only as misdemeanors, including
some theft crimes where the value is between $250 and $950.”).
376. ATTORNEY GEN. OF CAL., INITIATIVE NO. 17-0044, REDUCING CRIME AND KEEPING
CALIFORNIA SAFE ACT OF 2018 (2017), https://www.oag.ca.gov/system/files/initiatives/pdfs/170044%20%28Reducing%20Crime%29.pdf.
377. Id. at 15.
378. Id. at 16–17.
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These attacks on Proposition 47 are even more alarming because
sentencing reforms aimed at nonviolent offenders are often considered
the achievable “low hanging fruit” of criminal justice reform.379 While
incremental reforms show promise, especially considering
California’s extremely punitive history, violent offenders continue to
take up the majority of all prison beds.380 Thus, to ever truly reduce
mass incarceration in a lasting way, political actors and the electorate
will eventually need to confront lessening punishment for violent
offenders, an impossible task if a popular and largely successful lowlevel reform like Proposition 47 is dismantled.381
While the California Supreme Court certainly should not
judicially override the text of Proposition 47 or other statutes, neither
should the court lose sight of the current progressive climate or what
is at stake in preserving California’s recently hopeful, yet vulnerable
sentencing reforms. Historically, California’s voters, legislators,
executive branch, and other political actors have created an incoherent
overlap of extremely punitive sentencing laws.382 If courts, ideally
somewhat outside the fray, can bring some clarity and balance to their
interpretation of Proposition 47 and other initiatives (although
strapped with the epistemological challenge of uncovering voter
intent), it would represent a step in the right direction. California has
no choice but to move tentatively forward into this new era of justice
reform.

379.
380.
381.
382.

PFAFF, supra note 8, at 186.
Id. at 188.
Id.; see supra Section II(C).
Supra Part II.

